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CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR MISCONDUCT IN
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
Susan M. Kuzma*
In April 1988, Stephen Breuning, formerly a research
psychologist with the University of Pittsburgh, was indicted in
federal district court in Baltimore' for falsifying his research
results. The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) had
provided Breuning with grants of more than $150,000 to
investigate the effects of treating hyperactive retarded
children with Ritalin and Dexedrine. Breuning's research was
well-known in the field. Nevertheless, he was accused of not
performing the studies that he claimed to have performed.
His plea of guilty in September 1988 supports the truth of the
allegation.2
Breuning's prosecution raised the disquieting issue of
misconduct by scientific researchers and the questions of
whether and how a person conducting scientific research
should be criminally prosecuted for misconduct related to that
research. Although interest in the problem of scientific
misconduct has been sporadic, in recent years there has been
a swell of concern about and attention to the subject. In the
past decade the media has reported on a number of distressing
incidents of scientific misconduct. Congressional hearings,
professional rules of conduct, and Breuning's criminal prosecu-
tion have marked recent efforts to confront this difficult
problem.
Unpleasant and unsettling as it is to contemplate, criminal
prosecution can serve a valuable role in deterring and con-
demning some forms of scientific misconduct and therefore
should not be rejected in favor of internal controls. At the
same time, investigation and prosecution of scientific miscon-
duct raise the special issues of the competence of prosecutor
* Attorney Advisor, Office of Pardon Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice.
B.A., Ohio State University, 1975; J.D., Ohio State University, 1978. This Article
was written when the author was an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of
Louisville. The views expressed are the personal views of the author, who does not
purport to speak in an official capacity or to represent the views of the Justice
Department.
1. Indictment, United States v. Breuning; No. K-88-0135 (D. Md. Apr. 15,
1988).
2. United States v. Breuning, No. K-88-0135 (D. Md. Sept. 19, 1988).
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and jury, the chilling effect of government oversight on the
conduct of scientific research, and the possible entangling of
government and science.
This Article will explore our society's attitude to prosecuting
scientific misconduct, the need to consider prosecution in such
cases, and the utility of current statutes available for prosecu-
tion. To assist the reader in understanding the issues, this
Article will provide some background information about
misconduct in scientific research and will include a discussion
of some specific incidents. These background materials
provide a context for my argument that criminal sanctions
should be available to punish scientific misconduct. Finally,
I propose a federal criminal statute designed specifically for
prosecuting scientific misconduct.
I. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF MISCONDUCT IN
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
3
Scientific misconduct is not a recent phenomenon, nor has
it been limited to a few deranged and obscure individuals.
Some well-known and ingenious scientists are believed to have
been involved in scientific misconduct. Ptolemy,4 Galileo,5
3. For two detailed explorations of the problems raised by scientific miscon-
duct, see WILLIAM BROAD & NICHOLAS WADE, BETRAYERS OF THE TRUTH (1982) and
ALEXANDER KOHN, FALSE PROPHETS (1986). The examples described in this Article
are largely drawn from these sources. For further information see Patricia K. Woolf,
Deception in Scientific Research, in AAAS-ABA National Conference of Lawyers and
Scientists, PROJECT ON SCIENTIFIC FRAUD AND MISCONDUCT, Report on Workshop
Number One 37, 42-65 (1988) [hereinafter PROJECT ON SCIENTIFIC FRAUD].
4. The view of Claudius Ptolemy, the great astronomer of second century
Alexandria, Egypt, that the planetary system was centered by the earth, dominated
scientific thought until it was successfully challenged by Copernicus in the 1500s.
An astronomer in the modern era, however, has reexamined Ptolemy's data and has
questioned whether he actually observed what he reported. This astronomer points
to the inaccuracy of Ptolemy's reported observations as evidence that he actually
relied on observations made by Hipparchus of Rhodes nearly 300 years earlier.
BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 24-25. For more detailed dlescriptions of Ptolemy's
work, see ROBERT R. NEWTON, THE CRIME OF CLAUDIUS PTOLEMY (1977). At least one
modern scholar has defended Ptolemy's reputation. BROAD & WADE, supra note 3,
at 25-26.
5. Galileo has been faulted in modern times for generating experimental data
that are too good to be true:
With Galileo, the desire to make his ideas prevail apparently led him to report
experiments that could not have been performed exactly as described. Thus
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Newton,6 and Mendel7 are among the scientific greats whose
achievements have been scrutinized in modern times because
of suspicions that some of those achievements were obtained
in less than honest ways.8 These and other examples are
useful in defining the elusive problem of scientific misconduct
and in evaluating both its potential for harm and the extent
to which internal controls prevent such misconduct or expose
it after it occurs.
Several modern incidents illustrate how scientific miscon-
duct can occur and how it is treated in the post-World War II
era. One of the more notorious incidents of wrongdoing
an ambiguous attitude toward data was present .from the very beginning of
Western experimental science. On the one hand, experimental data was
upheld as the ultimate arbiter of truth; on the other hand, fact was subordi-
nated to theory when necessary and even, if it didn't fit, distorted. The
Renaissance saw the flowering of Western experimental science, but in Galileo,
the propensity to manipulate fact was the worm in the bud.
BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 27.
6. Sir Isaac Newton, whose theories formed the basis for the study of physics,
is faulted for having introduced a "fudge factor" in the reporting of his research
results in order to obtain greater acceptance for his theories. Richard S. Westfall,
Newton and the Fudge Factor, 179 SCI. 751, 751-52 (1973). Later editions of
Newton's Principia contained measurements that supported his theories more than
those he had initially reported. This enhanced accuracy, it is claimed, was no small
part of the reason for the acceptance of Newton's work. See BROAD & WADE, supra
note 3, at 27-29. 'Not the least part of the Principia's persuasiveness was its deliber-
ate pretense to a degree of precision quite beyond its legitimate claim." Westfall,
supra, at 751-52.
7. The data generated by Gregor Mendel, the father of modern genetics, also
have been scrutinized in modern times. The great degree of the conformity of his
observations to his theory has been criticized as unlikely to match the results of
actual experimentation. Whether this apparent misreporting of results was
intentional or not, or even done by Mendel himself, is the subject of some debate, but
the consensus seems to be that the data reported were too good to be true. BROAD
& WADE, supra note 3, at 31-33.
8. At least one commentator has defended these scientists:
Because standards of scientific honesty vary with concepts of method, one
should be highly suspicious of any person who accuses scientists from
centuries past of fraud: the person making the charge is probably guilty of
methodological anachronism. For example, the accusations leveled against
Ptolemy, Galileo, Newton, Dalton, Mendel, and Millikan by William Broad and
Nicholas Wade ... should be taken with a grain of salt. In the case of Mendel,
they simply repeat Ronald A. Fisher's charges against him without even men-
tioning the literature defending Mendel against Fisher.
Warren Schmaus, An Analysis of Fraud and Misconduct in Science, in PROJECT ON
SCIENTIFIC FRAUD, supra note 3, at 114 n.19. Broad and Wade, however, include
references to authorities other than Fisher, including some whose views are more
favorable to Mendel. BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 32-33.
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involved John Darsee, a doctor engaged in cardiovascular
research at Emory and then at Harvard.9 Darsee, then
working as an instructor at the Harvard Medical School and
on a National Institutes of Health (NIH) fellowship, was
caught fabricating raw data for an experiment. ° Darsee
was removed from the faculty appointment and the fellow-
ship, but was allowed to remain as a researcher. Subsequent
research data collected by Darsee were questioned, leading to
investigations both by the Medical School and by the NIH.
The investigation uncovered various irregularities in the
research results Darsee had reached at Harvard. A later
investigation by Emory confirmed the validity of only two of
the ten papers and two of the forty-five abstracts that Darsee
had published at Emory." One of the unusual aspects of
Darsee's research reports was the reported assistance of three
persons whose existence the investigating committees were
unable to substantiate.
2
Equally notorious is the case of William Summerlin, 3 a
dermatologist who was engaged as a researcher in the field of
immunology at the prestigious Sloan-Kettering Institute for
Cancer Research in New York. Summerlin was studying the
rejection of tissue grafts. Working with skin grafts among
genetically unrelated mice and corneal grafts from humans to
rabbits, Summerlin claimed to have developed a method for
ensuring that grafts were not rejected.' 4  Summerlin's
reported findings were significant because he appeared to
have found a way to suppress the immune reaction that could
9. The Darsee incident is described in greater detail in BROAD & WADE, supra
note 3, at 13-15, and in KOHN, supra note 3, at 84-88.
10. BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 14; KOHN, supra note 3, at 84-85. Darsee
claimed that he was reproducing data from an earlier experiment that had been lost.
Id. at 85.
11. See KOHN, supra note 3, at 87.
12. Id. at 88.
13. The story of Summerlin's misconduct is described at length in several
sources: BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 153-57; JOSEPH HIXSON, THE PATCHWORK
MOUSE (1976); KOHN, supra note 3, at 76-83; Barbara J. Culliton, The Sloan-
Kettering Affair: A Story Without a Hero, 184 SCI. 644, 644-50 (1974); Barbara J.
Culliton, The Sloan-Kettering Affair (II): An Uneasy Resolution, 184 SCI. 1154,
1154-57 (1974) [hereinafter Uneasy Resolution]; Gail McBride, The Sloan-Kettering
Affair: Could It Have Happened Anywhere?, 229 JAMA 1391, 1391-1410 (1974). For
a detailed account of the peer review committee appointed to investigate Summerlin's
activity, see C. Chester Stock et al., SUMMERLIN PEER REVIEW COMM., Report
(May 17, 1974) [hereinafter SUMMERLIN PEER REVIEW REPORT], reprinted in HIXSON,
supra, at 199 app. 1.
14. BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 154; KOHN, supra note 3, at 76.
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solve an important problem in transplant surgery and also
might help evaluate the theory that cancer is related to
malfunctioning of the immune system. 5
Other researchers, including researchers working under
Summerlin, were unable to duplicate Summerlin's work.
Skepticism about Summerlin's work led to a request by
Summerlin's boss (and director of the Institute), Dr. Robert
A. Good, for a conference about Summerlin's research.
Summerlin brought to the conference white mice with dark
patches of skin that supposedly had been transplanted from
genetically unrelated dark mice. Good was satisfied by the
demonstration, but a lab technician afterward noticed a
peculiar thing about the dark patch on a white mouse-it
rubbed off with alcohol. This discovery led to Summerlin's
confession that he had darkened the area on the animal
with a felt tip pen.' 6  Further inquiry determined that
Summerlin's dark mice and white mice were actually geneti-
cally related to one another, making it less, if at all, sur-
prising that the grafts were not rejected. Investigators
detected other irregularities in Summerlin's operating
procedures, including the fact that most of his claimed
successful grafts could be neither confirmed nor disproved
because the animals on which the grafts were performed had
been destroyed. 7
15. HIXSON, supra note 13, at 6.
16. BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 155; SUMMERLIN PEER REVIEW REPORT,
supra note 13, at 202-03. A similar case of painting a test animal occurred in 1926
in connection with studies done by Paul Kammerer, a biologist in Vienna. Kammerer
was studying Lamarck's theory that acquired characteristics could be genetically
transmitted to offspring. One of Kammerer's test animals was the midwife toad.
This toad mates on land rather than in water, and so the male lacks the dark colored
"nuptial pads" on its feet that water-mating toads use to grip the slippery skin of the
female toads with which they mate. Kammerer reported that after forcing the
midwife toads to mate in water rather than on land, the males developed nuptial
pads and their male offspring were thereafter born with pads.
Another scientist, however, discovered that the dark pad on one of Kammerer's
male toads was actually the result of a subcutaneous injection of ink. Kammerer
acknowledged that the scientist's observation was true, but denied knowledge of how
the ink came to be injected. The next day Kammerer committed suicide. For a
general account of the incident, see BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 182-85; KOHN,
supra note 3, at 45-48. It is a matter of debate whether Kammerer was responsible
for the forgery. BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 184-85; KOHN, supra note 3, at 46.
See generally ARTHUR KOESTLER, THE CASE OF THE MIDWIFE TOAD (1971) (presenting
a strong defense of Kammerer).
17. See KOHN, supra note 3, at 78-79; SUMMERLIN PEER REVIEW REPORT, supra
note 13, at 205. Summerlin claimed that the mice were destroyed to obtain serum
for later antibody tests. The investigating committee that looked into Summerlin's
WINTER 1992]
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With respect to Summerlin's corneal transplants on rabbits,
Summerlin's plan was to have each rabbit receive two human
corneal transplants, with one cornea left untreated and the
other treated according to Summerlin's procedure for prevent-
ing rejection. If the experiment worked, each rabbit would
have one cloudy eye, in which the untreated corneal trans-
plant had been rejected, and one clear eye, in which the
treated corneal transplant was accepted. In fact, only one eye
of each rabbit received a transplant, thereby leaving each test
animal with one clear eye and one cloudy eye, not because the
clear eye contained a treated cornea, but because it had not
been operated upon at all."8 Summerlin, however, claimed
that both eyes of each rabbit received corneal transplants,
and continued in this claim even after assistants brought the
problem to his attention. Summerlin maintained that the
problem was attributable to a misunderstanding between him
and the ophthalmologists who actually performed the surgery.19
misconduct found Summerlin's explanation "astonishing," and found it "scarcely
conceivable that Dr. Summerlin could have believed, in such immunologically
sophisticated surroundings as Dr. Good's group at Minnesota, that it is necessary to
kill a mouse to obtain serum." Id.
18. KOHN, supra note 3, at 80.
19. See id. at 80; SUMMERLIN PEER REVIEW REPORT, supra note 13, at 213. The
Peer Review Committee that investigated Summerlin rejected Summerlin's explanation:
Before the Committee, Dr. Summerlin gave no rational explanation of how
anyone could conclude that any particular rabbit had been doubly grafted....
... The only possible conclusion is that Dr. Summerlin was responsible for
initiating and perpetuating a profound and serious misrepresentation about the
results of transplanting cultured human corneas to rabbits.
Id.
The remarks of Nobel Prize-winner Peter Medawar, who was shown Summerlin's
rabbits, provide valuable insight about how Summerlin could have pulled off his
misrepresentation:
Through a perfectly transparent eye this rabbit looked at the board with the
candid and unwavering gaze of which only a rabbit with an absolutely clear
conscience is capable.
I could not believe that this rabbit had received a graft of any kind, not so
much because of the perfect transparency of the cornea as because the pattern
of blood vessels in the ring around the cornea was in no way disturbed.
Nevertheless, I simply lacked the moral courage to say at the time that I thought
we were the victims of a hoax or confidence trick. It is easy in theory to say
these things, but in practice very senior scientists do not like trampling on their
juniors in public.
P.B. Medawar, The Strange Case of the Spotted Mice, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Apr. 15,
1976, at 8.
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Summerlin's relationship with the institution was severed,
but he was placed on medical leave for one year before he was
terminated." The event did not end his career in medicine,
however; according to information provided at a congressional
hearing in 1981, Summerlin was practicing medicine as a
dermatologist.2
Another rather remarkable instance of scientific misconduct,
involving a researcher named Elias Alsabti, reveals how even
detection of wrongdoing might not put an end to it. Alsabti
20. HIXSON, supra note 13, at 91-92. Uneasy Resolution, supra note 13, at
1154-55 (1974).
21. Testimony before the House Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
of the Committee on Science and Technology disclosed that although Summerlin did
not continue as a researcher, he was able to continue practicing medicine:
MR. [Albert] GORE[, Jr., Chairman].... Your testimony states and I quote:
The disincentives for wrongdoing are powerful and in most instances the
individual is unable to establish himself or herself as a respected scientist and
seek other means of livelihood.
Isn't it true that in the most recent and celebrated cases of falsification of
data the individuals involved are still in medicine, although not doing
research?
Dr. Summerlin continues work as a dermatologist .... How much of a
penalty is that?
DR. [William F.] RAUB[, Associate Director for Extramural Research and
Training, NIH, Public Health Service, Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS)]. My statement was concerned specifically with a career in
research. Those who enter research rarely do it for any motivation other than
the excitement of a research career and perhaps the desire to achieve
immortality in what one discovers.
The inability to practice that livelihood for whatever circumstances for one
genuinely motivated to work at a career in research is a severe penalty and
most indeed don't achieve that re-entry. Having been trained in areas related
to research, such as the practice of medicine, they are able to find employment
in some circumstances.
Fraud in Biomedical Research: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Investiga-
tions and Oversight of the Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
286 (1981) [hereinafter Fraud in Biomedical Research]; see also infra note 42 (noting
that another researcher found work as a surgical pathologist after discovery that he
had fabricated his data).
Instances of alleged wrongdoing within the medical research community continue
to surface. In 1986 problems with data were discovered in connection with the
claimed discovery of a molecule called interleukin-4A. Published and submitted
papers relating to the alleged discovery were retracted in 1986. See Robert
Steinbrock, Fraud on Rise: Faking It in Biomedical Research, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29,
1987, § 1, at 1. One year later, the NIH censured Dr. Charles Glueck, a researcher
who studied cholesterol in children, for errors in the presentation of his data.
Laurence K. Altman, Cholesterol Researcher Is Censured for Misrepresenting Data in
Article, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1987, § 1, at 8; see also Credit and Credibility in Science,
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1987, at E26; Charles J. Glueck, No Fraud Was Found in
Cholesterol Report, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1987, at A22 (letter to the editor).
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managed to carry out a successful career as a researcher in
oncology for three years by misrepresenting his credentials
and plagiarizing the articles of other scientists.22 According
to one study of Alsabti's ventures:
The exploits of Alsabti could never have occurred in a
community of scientists where rigorous self-policing was
the rule and instant expulsion was the automatic penalty
for any form of dishonesty. Even when his methods
eventually came to light, fellow researchers were reluc-
tant to make a public issue of his cheating. Alsabti
would be allowed to leave quietly, and would find a job in
another laboratory where the same process would start
over again. It was only after Alsabti's methods were
described in a handful of international journals that the
career of this ... plagiarist came to a halt.23
Even when a researcher's study is questioned, the re-
searcher's intent may be impossible to ascertain. Investiga-
tors have raised questions about the data of Cyril Burt,24 the
British psychologist whose research into whether IQ and
heredity are linked was influential in England and the United
States. 25 Burt claimed to have conducted several studies that
traced the intellectual development of a number of twins who
were separated and raised apart, as well as twins who were
raised together. Several years after Burt's death, however,
other psychologists questioned the validity of Burt's data,
partly because of an exact coincidence of statistical correla-
tions from one study to another that could not plausibly be
22. See BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 38-55. The flagrancy of Alsabti's
conduct is difficult to capture in a summary, but is epitomized by the following
account of Alsabti's plagiarism:
Each passing month saw another group of Alsabti articles appear in various
journals around the world. His method was simplicity itself. He would retype
an already published paper, remove the author's name, substitute his own, and
send the manuscript off to an obscure journal for publication. His tactics
deceived the editors of dozens of scientific journals around the world.
Id. at 45.
23. Id. at 38.
24. The story of the debate over Burt's research can be found in BROAD & WADE,
supra note 3, at 203-11, and KOHN, supra note 3, at 52-57.
25. BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 203-06; KOHN, supra note 3, at 52.
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explained by chance.26 In addition, Burt claimed to have
collected data through two colleagues; the fact that a reporter
was unable to trace or locate these colleagues led some to
speculate either that Burt had fabricated their existence or
that at least they did not perform the research Burt attributed
to them.27 Scientists disagree about whether Burt's data
were deliberately fabricated, merely fudged, or even inadver-
tently misreported. 8
Similar ambiguity surrounds the case of Mark Spector, a
graduate student who worked on the transformation of normal
cells into cancer cells. Spector claimed to have identified a
chemical process by which this change occurred, a chemical
process he said was documented with radiographs generated
to test his theory. It turned out, however, that the radio-
graphs were in fact the product of manipulation. Spector
disclaimed responsibility for the misrepresentation, but later
was asked to leave his position after he failed to recreate fully
his claimed findings.29
These examples give some inkling of the variety of miscon-
duct that has occurred within the scientific community, and
the technical complexity of the factual situations such mis-
conduct might entail. These examples also demonstrate the
relatively light sanctions some people engaged in wrongdoing
have received.
II. TYPES OF MISCONDUCT
An initial difficulty in thinking about scientific misconduct
is the definition of misconduct. One scientist's mistake or
oversight is another's deliberate misrepresentation; two
scientists may simply disagree about the interpretation of
data.3 ° It is certainly legitimate to disagree about the proper
26. BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 206-07.
27. Id. at 207-08.
28. KOHN, supra note 3, at 54.
29. See BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 60-73; KOHN, supra note 3, at 103.
Spector was able to recreate enough of his results to make it difficult for scientists
to reject all his work. BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 68-69; KOHN, supra note 3,
at 103. A further inquiry also revealed that Spector had a criminal record for forgery.
BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 69; KOHN, supra note 3, at 103.
30. See, for example, the controversy generated by Walter W. Stewart & Ned
Feder, The Integrity of Scientific Literature, 325 NATURE 207 (1987), as is reflected
WINTER 1992]
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definition of misconduct, but reported instances of misconduct
carve out an area of behavior so indefensible that no one would
consider it intellectual nickel-and-diming to refuse to dismiss
such behavior as mere difference of opinion or honest mistake.
The most obvious example would be the reporting of results for
experiments that were never performed.3' Done on a large
enough scale, such misconduct can be defended as innocent
only by assuming incompetence and sloppiness of the most
egregious sort. For the purposes of the present discussion,
then, the term "misconduct" will be used in its broadest sense
to include all forms of deviation from standard practice that
could be viewed as deliberate. Plausible innocent explanations
for such conduct will be considered separately.32
in Eugene Braunwald's reply to the article, Eugene Braunwald, On Analysing
Scientific Fraud, 325 NATURE 215 (1987), and an editorial explaining the two, Fraud,
Libel and the Literature, 325 NATURE 181 (1987).
31. See United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding the
convictions of scientists who underreported the number of deaths of test rats), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1183 (1986), discussed infra notes 61-79 and accompanying text.
32. Compare, for example, the definitions employed in the Public Health
Service's regulations governing the responsibility of institutions that are awarded or
apply for grants to deal with and report possible misconduct in science: "Misconduct
or Misconduct in Science means fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, or other
practices that seriously deviate from those that are commonly accepted within the
scientific community for proposing, conducting, or reporting research. It does not
include honest error or honest differences in interpretations or judgments of data."
42 C.F.R. § 50.102 (1990).
Also instructive are the definitions used in a study of scientific misconduct
conducted by Martin F. Shapiro and Robert D. Charrow:
In this study, scientific misconduct is operationally defined as (1) the
execution of a study in a way that compromises the validity or reliability of the
findings, or (2) violation of the rights of the subjects who participate in the
study. Scientific misconduct by an investigator involves taking an action that
a reasonably prudent investigator would not have taken or failing to take an
action that a reasonably prudent investigator would have taken. This defini-
tion encompasses a broad spectrum of conduct, from negligence to fraud.
Negligence in research may be a consequence of cutting corners in the conduct
of the study or may be due to the incompetence of the investigator. Fraud, on
the other hand, involves deliberate misrepresentation of the data, in the form
of either "fudging" (altering the results) or "dry labbing" (generating data
without performing the study).
Martin F. Shapiro & Robert D. Charrow, Special Report, Scientific Misconduct in
Investigational Drug Trials, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 731, 731 (1985) [hereinafter
Shapiro & Charrow I]. See also H.R. REP. No. 101-688, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1990) [hereinafter CONFLICTS REPORT] ("Scientific fraud has been defined in a
variety of ways, that have differing legal and practical implications. Virtually all
definitions share the tenet that scientific fraud is the 'deliberate misrepresentation
of something as a fact by someone who knows that it is not.'" (footnote omitted)).
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One genre of possible scientific wrongdoing involves the
misrepresentation of research results, which may take a
number of forms. Perhaps the most blatant, as noted above,
is the reporting of results for experiments or tests that in fact
were never performed." Such fabrication of data may be
entire or partial; either no experiments were performed to test
the hypothesis, or some experiments were performed, but
fewer than the number reported. For example, Robert
Slutsky, an associate professor at the Medical School of the
University of California at San Diego and a prodigious author
(turning out a paper every ten days), was investigated in 1985.
The investigation concluded that twelve of his 137 articles
were fraudulent, and forty-eight were "questionable."34
Among the misrepresentations that Slutsky made were reports
of experiments that had never been performed.35
Another well-known incident of data fabrication involved
John Long, a researcher at the Massachusetts General
Hospital who specialized in the study of Hodgkin's disease.36
Long achieved a degree of prestige in the field of medical
research, and was awarded some $750,000 in grants to
support his research. 37 Long's assistant discovered that Long
had fabricated data in order to rectify a perceived problem
with a paper submitted for publication.38 The paper had
been rejected initially because a particular measurement made
by Long's assistant was unexpectedly low. 39 Long supposedly
made another measurement, while his assistant was on
vacation, that conformed more closely to the expected mea-
surement, and the paper was then accepted for publication.
A challenge by Long's assistant to Long's data led to the
33. This is not to say that the hypothesis is necessarily inaccurate; it is just
unproven. Fabrication, of course, is not an invention of the modern era. Charles
Babbage refers to fabrication as "forging" in his 1830 book, CHARLES BABBAGE,
REFLECTIONS ON THE DECLINE OF SCIENCE IN ENGLAND (Augustus M. Kelley 1970)
(1830). Babbage notes that "instances of the occurrence of forging are rare." Id. at
177. See also infra note 46.
34. CONFLICTS REPORT, supra note 32, at 15.
35. See id. at 15-16; Robert L. Engler et al., Misrepresentation and Responsi-
bility in Medical Research, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1383 (1987); Daniel S. Greenberg,
Lab-Scam: How Science Goes Bad, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1988, at D3; Nicholas Wade,
Looking Hard at Science's Self Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1988, at E9.
36. A detailed discussion of the case of John Long is found in BROAD & WADE,
supra note 3, at 89-96; KOHN, supra note 3, at 93-97.
37. BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 90; KOHN, supra note 3, at 95.
38. BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 91; KOHN, supra note 3, at 94-95.
39. BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 90; KOHN, supra note 3, at 94.
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discovery that Long had fabricated not only his data but also
(apparently after being challenged) his work papers in order to
appear to have documentation of his data.4 °
Long resigned, and an investigation of his research efforts
disclosed a number of other serious problems with Long's
research. For example, three of the four lines of cells that Long
was studying came not from unrelated human beings, as Long's
research claimed, but from a monkey.4' Investigators assumed
that Long's human cells had become contaminated with monkey
cells and that ultimately the human cells had died out, leaving
only monkey cells. Long claimed that he was unaware of the
problem.42
Another form of misrepresenting data is the practice of
"cooking" data,43 which might include selectively reporting
data" or performing numerous, originally unplanned, statisti-
cal analyses on data to make the numbers come out right.
40. BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 92-93; KOHN, supra note 3, at 95.
41. BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 92-93; KOHN, supra note 3, at 95.
42. According to Long's testimony before the Subcommittee on Investigations
and Oversight of the House Committee on Science and Technology in 1981, he was
a practicing surgical pathologist and was hired by people "with full awareness" of his
problems in research. Fraud in Biomedical Research, supra note 21, at 62.
The rather unusual but nonetheless documented instances involving the deliberate
creation of a hoax, such as the infamous Piltdown Man, also fall within this category
of scientific wrongdoing. The Piltdown Man was an archeological find in the early
1900s that supposedly represented parts of the skull of a prehistoric man. In fact,
the parts included nonhuman bones and human bones altered to make them appear
old. It took more than thirty years for the forgery to be discovered. See STEVEN JAY
GOULD, THE PANDA'S THUMB 108-24 (1980); BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 119-22;
KOHN, supra note 3, at 133-41.
43. See BABBAGE, supra note 33, at 178-83.
44. Selective reporting of data appears to have been a problem of Nobel Prize-
winner Robert Millikan. A physicist, Millikan was involved in efforts to measure the
electrical charge of electrons. Millikan believed that electrons had a single charge,
but his competitor, Austrian physicist Franz Ehrenhaft, believed there were
fractional charges carried by subelectrons. Variability in the measurements of
charges, then, tended to support Ehrenhaft's rather than Millikan's theory. In a 1913
article Millikan claimed to have reported the results from all his experiments, but
subsequent examination of his notebooks revealed that he had omitted a significant
percentage of his data from the report. BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 33-35;
KOHN, supra note 3, at 57-62; Steinbrock, supra note 21, at 1 ("In recent years
physicists-using more accurate equipment than was available to either Millikan or
Ehrenhaft-have accumulated evidence suggesting that Ehrenhaft may have been
correct after all. Most scientists now believe that electrons, like other subatomic
particles, are made from smaller units called quarks.").
Theodore X. Barber describes a similar problem: the failure to report that the
experimental data did not support the original hypothesis. THEODORE X. BARBER,
PITFALLS IN HuMAN RESEARCH 20-21 (1976). Instead, the experimenter, after
studying the data, derives a new hypothesis that is supported by the data. Id. at 21.
The experimenter then verifies the new hypothesis by performing statistical analysis
on the old data rather than testing the new hypothesis through a new study. Id.
Scientific Misconduct
A related form of misrepresentation of data is "trimming,"
whereby the researcher evens out data by "clipping off little
bits here and there from those observations which differ most
in excess from the mean, and in sticking them on to those
which are too small; a species of 'equitable adjustment.'
45
Clearly, aberrant data may be just that, but the uninformed
public is unable to draw or to test that conclusion with
independent consideration of whether the data are truly
aberrant or instead indicate a flaw in the hypothesis.46
Other lapses include the failure to report lack of adherence
to the planned procedure, or "protocol," for conducting the
experiment.4" Such failures to report mislead the public into
believing that all tests were conducted in a particular way.
Thus, another scientist might be unable to duplicate the
experiment because the experiment was conducted in a
manner different from what was reported. Moreover, if
another scientist knew about the departures from protocol, she
might conclude that the results were influenced by, and thus
must be interpreted in light of, the different protocol actually
used.
Clearly, failures of this sort may be inadvertent, or a result
of the failure to appreciate the existence or significance of the
lack of adherence to protocol. Likewise, a researcher may not
recognize or consider significant the failure to specify a precise
protocol for an experiment. A loose protocol may allow a
45. BABBAGE, supra note 33, at 178. In Babbage's view, "This fraud is not
perhaps so injurious... as cooking. . . [because] the average given by the observa-
tions of the trimmer is the same, whether they are trimmed or untrimmed." Id.
46. Data manipulation in the context of research in the behavioral sciences is
discussed in BARBER, supra note 44. Barber calls this manipulation "fudging," and
describes it as follows:
Although outright fraud (fudging ofall or most of the data) is probably very
rare in the behavioral sciences, "pushing the data", or letting desires and
biases influence the way the data are analyzed or reported, may not be too
rare .... For instance, after discussing instances of outright fraud in science,
[R.K.] Merton ... noted that probably much more common are instances of
"trimming" or "cooking" the data which are probably due to excessive concern
with success in scientific work.
Id. at 36 (referring to R.K. Merton, Priorities in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter in
the Sociology of Science, 22 AM. Soc. REV. 635-59 (1957)).
Babbage likewise attributes "trimming" to an objective on the part of the
"trimmer" to "gain a reputation for extreme accuracy in making observations."
BABBAGE, supra note 33, at 178. Babbage goes on to state, however, that "from
respect for truth, or from a prudent foresight, he [the 'trimmer'] does not distort the
position of the fact he gets from nature, and it is usually difficult to detect him. He
has more sense or less adventure than the Cook." Id.
47. BARBER, supra note 44, at 16.
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researcher to change the outcome of a particular phase of an
experiment by varying the way in which the experiment is
carried out each time it is run.4"
Another type of misconduct is the failure to record data. A
nonscientist might find it hard to accept that a scientist would
not record the results of tests or experiments and might
instead suppose that a failure to record data is in fact a failure
to do the experiments or tests at all.49 Skepticism about this
possibility is no doubt enhanced by the fact that on occasion,
when faced with allegations that particular experiments or
tests had not been performed at all, the implicated researchers
argued that they had done the experiments, but did not record
the results, or that they did record the results but did not
retain the data after a particular period of time.5 ° Another
48. Barber, after discussing the "rather rare instances" in which an experi-
menter has no formal protocol, describes the problem of loose protocol:
In a somewhat more common case than the one described above, the
experimental protocol has more precise specifications as to how the experiment
is to be conducted, but there is still much missing and there is room for the
experimenter to vary the procedure from subject to subject.... This failure to
plan for contingencies is also found in loose protocols that do not state what
the experimenter is to do at various steps in the procedure. . .. The data from
experiments that are based on loose experimental procedures are often
reported very precisely. However, since the precise data are based on loose
procedures that leave much room for bias, they can be misleading.
BARBER, supra note 44, at 17.
49. Unless, perhaps, the results were not favorable to the scientist's theory. In
the case against employees of Industrial Bio-Test, for example, described infra notes
61-79, deaths of rats used as test animals were not recorded; in that case, excessive rat
mortality might indicate that the product being tested was unsafe. United States v.
Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1985).
In connection with the investigation of research supervised by David Baltimore,
however, discussed infra note 153, the researcher whose work was questioned,
Dr. Thereza Imanishi-Kari, told Congress that data from print-out tapes sometimes
were not transcribed to lab notebooks until months after an experiment was performed.
Larry Thompson, Science Under Fire, WASH. POST, May 9, 1989, at Z12, Z15.
50. John Darsee raised this type of defense when he was the focus of an investiga-
tion, described supra notes 9-11, and the employees of Industrial Bio-Test made a
similar argument during their prosecution, described infra notes 61-79.
Similarly, the EPA in 1983 had to review its standard for carbon monoxide emissions
when questions regarding the validity of a study conducted to assess health effects on
heart patients could not be resolved, in part because of the loss or destruction of data
and failure to maintain adequate records by the physician who conducted the study.
Cass Peterson, EPA Probe Criticizes a Study Used in Air-Quality Standard, WASH.
POST, June 7, 1983, at A17.
An extreme example of a claim of document loss is described in the New York Times:
In 1978, medical officers from the F.D.A.'s Clinical Investigation branch of the
Division of Scientific Investigations within the Bureau of Drugs, decided to check
the doctor's records of patients involved in studies against data that had been
Scientific Misconduct
genre of misconduct is plagiarism, which can take the form of
lifting another's words or ideas, or even of stealing research
proposals.5
submitted to the agency. On April 25, the day of the inspection, Dr. Scheiner
told investigators that his office had been vandalized the night before and that
all the records relating to the studies that were to have been inspected had been
dumped into a whirlpool bath. Dr. Michael J. Hensley, a medical officer for the
F.D.A., later told Senate investigators that furniture had been slashed but that,
"it appeared that the [medical] certificates and diplomas had been removed from
the walls before the swastikas were painted. The outlines were clearly visible
where they had hung."
At hearings held in October 1979 by the Senate Subcommittee on Health and
Scientific Research, Dr. Hensley said that, before the next inspection, the
doctor-referred to in the hearings as "Dr. 3"-reported that there had been a
fire in his office. And the night before the rescheduled inspection, said
Dr. Hensley, "The doctor was allegedly mugged in his office and struck on the
head with a steel paperweight. It is worth noting, I guess, that the only prints
on the paperweight were the doctor's own."
Lynne McTaggart, Putting Drug Testers to the Test, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1980, § 6
(Magazine), at 174.
51. An incident involving a claim of plagiarism occurred at the Yale Medical
School. See BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 161-80; KOHN, supra note 3, at 88-93;
Fraud in Biomedical Research, supra note 21, at 80-104. An NIH researcher, Helena
Wachslicht-Rodbard, accused Philip Felig and Vijay Soman, then both faculty
members at the Yale School of Medicine, of plagiarizing passages from a manuscript
that she had authored. The paper had been submitted to a journal for publication,
and was sent for peer review to Felig, who passed it on to Soman. Soman had
undertaken earlier to study the same problem that was the subject of Wachslicht-
Rodbard's paper. Felig recommended that Wachslicht-Rodbard's paper not be
published. BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 163-64.
Shortly thereafter, a paper by Soman, in which Felig was listed as coauthor, was
circulated to Wachslicht-Rodbard's supervisor for peer review. When Wachslicht-
Rodbard's supervisor passed the paper on to her, she noticed passages that mirrored
passages from her own paper, but a full investigation began only after Wachslicht-
Rodbard invested an enormous amount of time and effort to convince her colleagues
that her complaint was valid. The investigation ultimately disclosed fabrication or
"fudging" of data by Soman on a number of papers. Id. at 165-80; KOHN, supra note
3, at 89-92. Other examples of this conduct include the case of Elias Alsabti, see
supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text, and the case of Shervert Frazier, the head
of McClean Hospital, Harvard University's psychiatric teaching facility, who resigned
his position after allegations were made that he had plagiarized papers between 1966
and 1975. John Crewdson, Cheating in the Lab, CHI. TRIB., March 19, 1989, at 1;
Peter G. Gosselin et al., Scientists Grapple with Increase in Fraud, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 4, 1988, § 4, at 1. See generally BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 57-59. For
other examples of scientific plagiarism, see KOHN, supra note 3, at 146-60. Broad
and Wade conclude the following about the subject of plagiarism:
The rewards in science are supposed to go strictly and exclusively for
originality. That is why scientists strive so desperately to establish priority
for their discoveries. It is also why, to judge from the frequency and bitterness
of complaints, researchers sometimes fail to make fair acknowledgment of the
work of their colleagues and competitors. The failure to make due acknowl-
edgment of another researcher is, in a minor way, a theft of his work.
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The possibility of financial conflicts of interest has re-
cently commanded attention.52 An example of this is when
Plagiary is an interesting phenomenon because it carries this common sin of
scientific reporting to extremes. Plagiary, the wholesale theft of another's
work, is so outrageous and obvious a crime that an outsider might predict
scientists would never commit it. The evidence shows that, to the contrary,
plagiary in the scientific community is not rare, that it probably often escapes
detection, that it takes time for even the most blatant cases of plagiary to
come to light, and that even those discovered committing plagiary are often
able to continue their careers unaffected. If plagiary, the grossest offense
against intellectual property, merits just knuckle-rap treatment from the
scientific community, what degree of indulgence must be accorded to lesser
crimes?
BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 59. Criminal sanctions for some forms of plagiarism
might be available under the federal copyright laws. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1988) (defining
criminal infringement of a copyright); 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (1988) (providing punish-
ments for criminal infringement of a copyright). Only the expression of the idea, not
the idea itself, is protected under the copyright laws.
52. See generally Federal Response to Misconduct in Science: Are Conflicts of
Interest Hazardous to Our Health?: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) [hereinafter Conflicts
Hearings] (examining the effects financial conflicts of interest have on scientific
research). Leonard Minsky, Ph.D., Executive Director of the National Association of
Universities in the Public Interest, describes an example of such a financial conflict
of interest:
[W]e have a case at the University of Florida in Gainesville ... where there
is a for profit firm occupying space in a research park. The dean of the college
of pharmacy had stock in the firm. Most of the principal researchers of the
college of pharmacy had stock or were consultants to the firm. Most of the
work done in the college of pharmacy was work done on the subject of interest
to the firm and when one colleague, a scientist in the college of pharmacy,
urged the firm to consider that the work they were doing was dangerous to the
workers and that the tests they were using were perhaps inappropriate for the
drug, he was fired as a consultant to the firm.
The way we put it, the college of pharmacy in this particular instance
becomes a wholly owned subsidiary of a private for profit firm because of the
nature of the relationships between the professors and the college of
pharmacy, and between the dean, the college of pharmacy and the firm.
Id. at 48-49.
Conflicts of interest in research were also explored in Is Science for Sale?
Conflicts of Interest vs. The Public Interest: Hearing Before the Human Resources and
Intergovernmental Relations Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations,
House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The recent prosecutions of
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) employees for accepting gifts from three
representatives of drug companies seeking approval of generic drugs raise a related
problem. While no evidence indicated that the FDA had approved unsafe drugs, it
appeared that the approval procedures were manipulated to the benefit of certain
companies. See FDA's Generic Drug Approval Process (Part 1): Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989) [hereinafter Generic Drug
Hearings].
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a researcher owns stock in the company whose product he is
testing or otherwise has a financial stake in the particular
research result. Financial conflicts raise not only the possibil-
ity of research-related misconduct but also the possibility that
a researcher will use research results inappropriately. For
example, a researcher, privy to significant research results
that could affect the value of the company's stock, might have
the opportunity to speculate in the stock on the basis of
information not generally available to the public.53
Failing to obtain informed consent from human research
subjects54 or otherwise failing to follow regulations governing
53. The case of Scheffer Tseng, a researcher at the Massachusetts Eye and Ear
Infirmary, demonstrates the potential for a link between research and the market
value of a company:
In October, medical school officials acknowledged that a junior researcher
at the Harvard-affiliated Massachusetts Eye and Ear Infirmary, Scheffer C.
G. Tseng, had tested an experimental eye drug on hundreds of patients while
helping organize a company to make it. The drug later proved largely
ineffective.
Tseng's experiments, conducted between 1984 and mid-1986, raised
questions about whether he failed to report negative effects of the drug to help
the company, Spectra Pharmaceutical Services Inc. of Hanover. Tseng and his
family made at least $1 million from stock sales and other payments from the
firm.
Gosselin et al., supra note 51, at 1. The Tseng affair is discussed in detail in William
Booth, Conflict of Interest Eyed at Harvard, 242 SCI. 1497 (1988).
Such conduct might raise interesting questions regarding "insider trading"
liability. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988) (giving contemporaneous traders a cause
of action against any person who violates the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by
purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material, nonpublic informa-
tion); United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986) (upholding the
conviction of an employee found guilty of securities fraud for misappropriating
material, nonpublic information from an employer), aff'd by an equally divided Court,
484 U.S. 19 (1987).
54. This species of misconduct is sufficiently distinct as to be beyond the scope
of this Article. The most well-known example of criminal prosecution for this type
of misconduct is the Nuremberg trials, in which the defendants were charged with
war crimes and crimes against humanity for carrying out nonconsensual experimen-
tal medical procedures. See HEINZ SCHULER, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL
RESEARCH 169-72 (Margaret S. Woodruff & Robert A. Wicklund trans., 1982).
Rules governing the conduct of medical experiments on human subjects were
formulated after World War II and became known as the "Nuremberg code." The
HHS has adopted regulations governing the use of human subjects in experiments.
45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.409 (1990).
In recent legal development relating to the problem of patient consent, the
California Supreme Court recognized civil causes of action for a physician's breach
of a fiduciary duty to disclose facts material to the patient's consent, and for the
performance of medical procedures without first having obtained the patient's
informed consent. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 485 (Cal. 1990) (en
banc), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1388 (1991). The court held, however, that a leukemia
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the conduct of particular sorts of experiments are other
potential forms of scientific misconduct. 5  Finally, garden-
variety property crimes such as embezzlement or misapplica-
tion of research funds also could be included as examples of
misconduct related to research. 6
III. PUNISHING SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT WITH
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
Setting aside the scientific context of the problems discussed
above, the familiar ring of problems that arise in virtually
every walk of life can be heard: lying and cheating, with a
healthy dose of mistake and negligence. Generally mistake
and negligence do not present criminal law concerns,5" so the
discussion will be confined to the first group of evils. Of
course not every dishonorable act is a crime (and fewer are
federal crimes), but some types of scientific misconduct raise
the same criminal law concerns that similar misconduct raises
outside the scientific arena. Indeed, some forms of misconduct
described earlier are clearly punishable under existing federal
statutes;58 in such cases, the federal interest in and ability to
prosecute does not depend on the scientific context.59
patient had no cause of action against his doctor for conversion of body cells removed
without the patient's consent for the doctor's research. Id. at 497.
55. For example, the FDA provides regulations dealing with "Good Laboratory
Practice for Nonclinical Laboratory Studies." 21 C.F.R. §§ 58.1-219 (1991). These
regulations set forth standards for "conducting nonclinical laboratory studies that
support or are intended to support applications for research or marketing permits for
products regulated by the Food and Drug Administration" such as drugs and food
additives. Id. at § 58.1. They cover a range of topics including personnel, equipment,
protocol, reporting, and record retention. Id. at §§ 58.1-.219.
56. Recent media accounts have raised the possibility of misuse of grant funds
at various universities. See, e.g., Turning Labs into Cedar Chests: Alchemy, Stanford
Style, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 4, 1991, at 70.
57. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) cmt. 5 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985) ("Since negligence is an exceptional basis of liability, it should be
excluded as a basis unless explicitly prescribed."). Scientific misconduct involving
negligence or quality-control issues, rather than the kind of deliberate or venal
misconduct with a high potential for harm that one associates with criminal conduct
is not an appropriate target of criminal law. Thus, failure to adhere to protocol is
hardly of criminal law interest and is the sort of misconduct that could be addressed
through internal controls.
58. Potentially applicable statutes include 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1988) (theft), 18
U.S.C. § 201 (1988) (bribery), and 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1988) (theft and bribery in certain
federally funded programs).
59. Stephen Breuning's submissions of false information to the HHS were
punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988), which prohibits using or making false
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Nor should the scientific context obscure or insulate from
scrutiny the fact that the actual or potential harm of particu-
lar conduct is characteristic of other conduct that is treated
criminally. Acts that wrongfully allow one to obtain money or
property, as well as acts that compromise the integrity of a
public process are no less wrong or harmful if they are done in
the context of scientific research. Misrepresenting research
results in order to obtain federal grant money is essentially
theft by false pretenses. It corrupts the governmental process
of awarding grant money. Misrepresentation of research
results also can corrupt other governmental decision-making
processes, such as a decision to allow the marketing of a food
additive.
The misrepresentation of research results, either in connec-
tion with efforts to obtain government funding of research or
in connection with other governmental decisions, has attracted
the attention of federal prosecutors because of its potential
financial impact and its tendency to undermine governmental
decision-making. In the applied research arena, prosecutions
have been brought for making false statements to a federal
agency, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), in
connection with the testing of drugs and food additives.6 0
documents in a matter within the jurisdiction of a department or agency of the
United States. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988). "Agency" is defined broadly and includes the
HHS. 18 U.S.C. § 6 (1988).
60. For example, Shapiro and Charrow describe the results of FDA investigations
that led to action being taken against an investigator involved in testing new drugs
for safety and efficacy in order to obtain approval for marketing. Shapiro &
Charrow I, supra note 32, at 732. Their analysis covers the period from January
1975 to February 1983:
[A]udits are initiated by the FDA if the data in a study appear to be too
.clean" or if the FDA observes that a clinician has enrolled a larger number of
subjects from his or her practice than seems realistically attainable. Still
other audits are triggered by problems in a previous FDA audit of the
investigator. For-cause audits may result in an action against the investigator
ranging from disqualification to restriction of his or her access to new drugs.
Some cases are referred to the U.S. Department of Justice for criminal
prosecution.
Id. A follow-up study by Shapiro and Charrow concluded that serious problems with
research declined after the FDA instituted an auditing program. Martin F. Shapiro
& Robert D. Charrow, The Role of Data Audits in Detecting Scientific Misconduct, 261
JAMA 2505 (1989). The article is discussed in Susan Okie, FDA Audits Apparently
Reduce Fraud in Drug Tests, WASH. POST, May 7, 1989, at A4.
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A good example is the criminal prosecution of the officers of
Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc.61 Based in Northbrook,
Illinois, Industrial Bio-Test (IBT) was one of the largest
laboratories to engage in contract research in the 1970s. IBT's
In their first study, Shapiro and Charrow cite the case of an obstetrician-
gynecologist who was paid $140,000 between 1975 and 1979 to test analgesics for
five drug companies:
In 1983, he was indicted and pleaded guilty to making false statements that
he had properly administered the medications to over 900 patients; failing to
give any of the medications to some patients whom he reported had received
them; including incorrect listings of surgical procedures for patients purport-
edly being treated for postoperative pain; and failing to note when other
medications, including other analgesics, were given to the patients. His
attorney acknowledged that he did not have accurate data but had filled in the
blanks and submitted data to the manufacturers "as if the drugs had been
administered and then proceeded to get paid for it." The physician also
concealed the falsified laboratory testing from his practice partners, put the
funds that he received for this purpose to his own use, and falsified the records
of an institutional review committee.
Shapiro & Charrow I, supra note 32, at 734. See also Nicholas Wade, Madness in
Their Method, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 27, 1983, at 13.
Other references to criminal prosecutions of doctors for fabrication of research
results can be found. See, e.g., Generic Drug Hearings, supra note 52, at 115
(describing the case of a doctor who was sentenced to four years' imprisonment and
$4 million in fines and restitution when he contracted with pharmaceutical companies
to perform tests but submitted false Medicare claims and falsely stated that he had
performed trial tests he never performed); Jersey Doctor Accused of Fraud in Drug
Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1988, at A32 (describing the indictment of Robert A.
Fogari, a New Jersey doctor, for conspiracy to defraud the FDA and for making false
statements to hinder an FDA investigation).
According to congressional hearing testimony, there is a prosecutorial bias toward
offenses under Title 18 (the federal criminal code) rather than offenses under Title
21 (the federal drug code, which contains a number of criminal statutes). Fraud in
Biomedical Research, supra note 21, at 309 (describing the testimony of Dr. Alan
Lisook, Chief of Clinical Investigation Branch, Division of Scientific Investigations,
Bureau of Drugs, FDA). This bias may be due to greater familiarity with Title 18
offenses, or greater potential sentences under Title 18.
61. United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1183 (1986). Another example is the 1978 indictment of six former and then
current officers of Velsicol Chemical Corporation for concealing from the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) laboratory data about two pesticides, chlordane and
heptachlor. The indictment was dismissed due to prosecutorial misconduct before the
grand jury. United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979). See also In re
November 1979 Grand Jury, 616 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1980) (denying Velsicol's efforts
to terminate a new grand jury proceeding). Certain registrations for chlordane and
heptachlor were later cancelled pursuant to a memorandum of understanding
between the EPA and Velsicol. Chlordane and Heptachlor Termiticides, 52 Fed. Reg.
42,145 (1987) (cancellation order).
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role in the world of contract research was to conduct animal
toxicity studies on various products subject to government
regulation, such as drugs and pesticides, in order to provide
factual support for submissions to regulatory agencies that the
products tested were safe and effective. In the mid- and late-
1970s, the FDA raised questions about the validity of IBT's
laboratory studies and findings.62 The lab closed in 1978.63
In June 1981, a federal grand jury returned an indictment
in Chicago against the former Manager of Toxicology of IBT,
the Section Head of Rat and Dog Toxicology, the Group Leader
of the Rat and Dog Toxicology Department, and the former
president of IBT.64 The charges alleged violations of the false
statement statute and the mail fraud statute relating to three
studies that had been performed by IBT.65 Three of the
62. Apparently the FDA first discovered the problem purely by chance and went
on to document serious defects in the data that IBT had reported. The EPA also
became involved because of the submission of data generated by IBT to support
applications for approval of various pesticides. Indeed, IBT had performed more than
4,000 studies upon which the registration of 123 pesticides and the establishment of
160 tolerance levels for pesticide residue had been based. Congress conducted
hearings into the problems with IBT and several other contract research companies
that were also under investigation because of irregularities in their reported research
data. Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1977: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Comm. on
Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (Part IV); Linda Garmon, Since the
Giant Fell, Sci. NEWS, July 4, 1981, at 11.
Congressional hearings included consideration of practices at IBT, G.D. Searle
Laboratories, and Biometric Testing, Inc. Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 1975: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare and the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice
and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)
(Part I) (Parts II and III are similarly titled but dated 1976); Preclinical and Clinical
Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1978: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978) (Part V).
Biometric Testing and several of its officers were indicted in 1979 by a federal
grand jury in Newark. Morton Mintz, Indictment Accuses Drug-Testing Firm of
Falsifying Results, WASH. POST, June 1, 1979, at A9. Biometric was found guilty and
two former officers of the company pleaded guilty. Lynne McTaggart, Putting Drug
Testers to the Test, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1980, § 6 (Magazine), at 174. The conviction
of Biometric is alluded to in United States v. Premo Pharmaceutical Lab., Inc., 511
F. Supp. 958, 1008 (D.N.J. 1981).
63. Keith Schneider, Some Older Pesticides Yield a Harvest of Ugly Surprises,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1986, at E5; Trial Ending for 3 Over Lab Safety Research, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 1983, § 1 at 21 [hereinafter Trial Ending].
64. Keplinger, 776 F.2d at 683-84; Garmon, supra note 62, at 11.
65. Keplinger, 776 F.2d at 684 n.2.
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defendants66 were convicted on charges relating to two of
those studies.67  Misconduct included failure to disclose
information," or false reporting and underreporting of data
to the FDA or Monsanto or Syntex Corporation, the chemical
companies for which the studies had been done.69
A synopsis of some of the false reports will illuminate the
kind of wrongdoing at issue. One study related to the chemi-
cal trichlorocarbanilide (TCC), which was used in deodorant
soaps, and the other related to an anti-inflammatory drug
called Naprosyn, which was used to treat arthritis. 70  A key
problem with the TCC study was alleged underreporting of the
rat mortality rate.71 The rats used in the TCC study had the
unfortunate tendency to die at a rate high enough to call into
question the validity of the study and any product safety
evaluations based on the study.72 According to the govern-
ment, IBT therefore sought to mask the high death rate by
substituting new animals for dead ones, and inaccurately
recording the number of deaths of rats.73 This "procedure"
66. A mistrial was granted as to one defendant due to health problems. Illinois
Case Mistrial Declared, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1983, at A15.
67. Keplinger, 776 F.2d at 684 n.2.
68. Id. at 684. These omissions comprised part of the basis for the fraud
charges, but liability for omissions can arise under the first clause of the false
statement statute, which punishes one who, in a matter within the jurisdiction of a
department or agency of the United States, "knowingly and willfully... conceals or
covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact." 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
69. Keplinger, 776 F.2d at 684. With respect to the false statement counts, the
false reports that were made to Monsanto were then submitted by Monsanto to the
FDA. Id.
70. Id.
71. Regarding the significance of rat mortality, the court of appeals noted:
"Accurate mortality data is important because it provides evidence of a substance's
impact on test animals and also because it can provide evidence of environmental
problems which might compromise the validity of a study." Id.
72. Id. at 685.
73. Id. at 685-86. To prove that substitution had occurred, the Government
called as witnesses two laboratory technicians who had observed rat deaths that had
not been accurately recorded and also produced both a draft report and an internal
IBT document that showed higher rat mortality rates than IBT eventually reported
to Monsanto. Testimony was also adduced that lab technicians filled empty rat cages
with new rats at several points in the study. Moreover, the evidence showed that at
the termination of the study, when all the animals were sacrificed, exactly the correct
number of male rats needed to ensure the validity of the 'study was found in each
group. Such a perfect statistical correlation was urged to be an unlikely coincidence,
suggesting that male rats had been added as needed to make the numbers come out
right. Finally, the total number of rats that died or were killed during the study was
greater than the total number of rats that had started the study. Id.
378
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clearly would result in an inaccurate picture of how many rats
had died in the course of the study, a fact of critical impor-
tance in evaluating the safety of the chemical used. 4
The Naprosyn study, performed for the Syntex Corporation,
also formed the basis of criminal charges. The government
Newspaper accounts describing the testimony of the lab technicians paint a grim
picture of lab conditions and procedures:
The witness, Philip Smith, said rats died in tests of the substance,
Trichlorocarbanilide, but he was told to write-a report showing no deaths in
the first six months of the study....
While Mr. Smith said that the cause of the rat deaths was often not
determined, they were caused in part by a frequently malfunctioning water
sprinkler designed to provide drinking water and to clean cages.
The mortality rate of rats in the room was two to three times higher than
normal, Mr. Smith said, adding, "Some rats would get no water; some had
constant water falling on them."
"Drain hoses would come unattached from racks and spray food and feces
on the floor and plug the drain," he said. Mr. Smith said he repeatedly
reported this.
Ex-Aide in Laboratory Says Data on Soap Ingredient Were Falsified, N.Y. TIMES,
May 9, 1983, at A17 [hereinafter Soap Ingredient Falsified]; see also Trial Ending,
supra note 63, at A21 (noting that the "animal feeding room [was] known as 'the
swamp'").
Similar testimony was recounted about other tests:
In separate research on the toxicity of Naprosyn, an arthritis drug, Mr.
Smith said Mr. Plank supplied results of blood and urine tests that were never
performed. He said that though he could not find the final test reports, Mr.
Plank told him "it would save time" if he wrote that the tests were negative.
Mr. Smith also said animals that died in this study often were not
examined for cause of death and were listed by Mr. Plank as succumbing to
diseases such as pneumonia that were unrelated to the substances being
tested.
[In research performed for another company,] "[s]ome animals were listed
as dying natural deaths, but I didn't know how they died," Mr. Smith said.
Soap Ingredient Falsified, supra.
74. Although the mere fact that rats died does not mean that the chemical was
unsafe, that is scarcely mitigating. Governmental action is predicated upon the
assumption that the data submitted to it are accurately reported. Without accurate
data, the government, and therefore the public, is forced to bear the risk that
accurate data would not substantiate the claim that the chemical is safe. As the
prosecutor in the IBT case said in closing argument, " 'what these defendants were
doing was gambling, rolling the dice, playing Russian roulette. Fortunately, the
chamber came up blank. But they didn't know what the results would be. There is
no room in science for gambling.'" 3 Ex-Officials of Major Laboratory Convicted of
Falsifying Drug Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1983, § 1, at 13.
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contended, among other things, that blood and urine data for
rats used in the study were fabricated and that gross pathol-
ogy data were largely fabricated. 7' As part of the govern-
ment's proof, there was testimony that the gross pathology
findings included animals whose bodies in fact had not been
examined but instead had been thrown away because they were
too badly decomposed to allow for autopsies. 6
The effects of IBT's actions were felt long after the case
ended because so many governmental decisions rested upon IBT
studies. The EPA, in the wake of questions raised about the
validity of IBT's data, was forced to review the validity of more
than a thousand IBT studies; in the interim, products marketed
on the basis of IBT studies remained on the market.77 In
1986, dinoseb, a chemical marketed at one point on the basis of
studies performed by IBT, was the subject of an emergency
order by the EPA banning its use or sale because new safety
tests had shown it to be an imminent hazard to human
health;7' a final cancellation was issued in mid-1988.
7 9
While prosecution for this type of conduct may not seem
problematic, one's intuition may be different when the context
shifts from applied to basic research. Perhaps the business
context or the perception of profit motive makes the harm seem
more tangible or the conduct more venal in situations like that
presented by the IBT case. When consideration is given to
prosecuting a university professor for misrepresenting research
results, however, some would find the criminal aspect of the
75. United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678, 689 (7th Cir. 1985).
76. Id. at 689-90.
77. Garmon, supra note 62, at 11; Barton Gellman, 35 Pesticides Face
Suspension over Test Data, WASH. POST, July 12, 1983, at Al; Mary Thorton, EPA
Review Finds Flawed Tests Made by Research Firm, WASH. POST, May 13, 1983, at
A3. The problem extended to products marketed in Canada as well. Faulty Tests
Lead to Canadian Chemical Ban, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1983, at A10.
78. Decision and Emergency Order Suspending the Registration of All Pesticide
Products Containing Dinoseb, 51 Fed. Reg. 36,634 (1986).
79. The history of EPA's action on dinoseb is recounted in Dinoseb Pesticide
Products, 54 Fed. Reg. 7,372, 7,373 (1989) (amended and final notice). The final
cancellation order was issued on June 9, 1988. Id. See also Schneider, supra note
63, at E5.
Growers sued the EPA to enjoin the emergency suspension order. Love v.
Thomas, 668 F. Supp. 1443, 1451 (D. Or. 1987) (granting preliminary injunction),
affd in part, 838 F.2d 1059, 1074 (9th Cir. 1988) (remanding for further consideration
of preliminary injunction). The EPA continued to process claims for indemnification
and requests for disposal of dinoseb. See, e.g., Dinoseb Pesticide Products, 54 Fed.
Reg. 7,372 (1989) (amended and final notice).
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conduct less clear and might not consider prosecution an option
at all. Some suggest that the problem is rare enough as not to
require concern,8 ° that internal controls are sufficient to deal
with the problem to the extent it exists,8 ' or that this sort of
misconduct simply is not the same as real crime. While some
support for each of these claims can be garnered, criminal
sanctions are necessary and useful in some contexts. To
evaluate the argument for criminal sanctions both the con-
ditions that may contribute to the existence of scientific
misconduct and the adequacy of nonpenal controls to address
problems of misconduct should be addressed.
A. The Need for Prosecution: Conditions for and
Nonpenal Controls of Misconduct
Scientists have played and continue to play an important
role in the evolution of our culture. Over the years, scientists
80. See Fraud in Biomedical Research, supra note 21, at 10-11 (testimony of
Dr. Philip Handler, President, National Academy of Sciences).
81. See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. A general description of this
view, termed "the conventional ideology of science," is found in BROAD & WADE, supra
note 3, at 15-18. The tenor of the disparity in views on this point was reflected in
a number of statements made before the Senate Subcommittee on Health and
Scientific Research. In discussing what, if any, political controls should be exerted
over science, Gerard Piel, the publisher of Scientific American, spoke about the self-
policing nature of science, including among his remarks the following:
It [the control of science] comes out of the self-governing democracy of the
scientific community, which no matter how fallible and error-prone and ridden
with clique and fashion and nonsense it is, provides a kind of knowledge that
is verifiable and objective. Nobody can be a crook, to quote a recent national
leader. Murder will out.
Biomedical Research and the Public: Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research
of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1977) [herein-
after Biomedical Research].
Piel contended that the ideal, of which the peer review system was an outgrowth,
must be a "self-governing community of independent sovereigns who are citizens and
scientists." Id. at 43. Piel's views were referred to later in the discussion as a "kind
of glorification and romanticization of the arrogation of special privileges to the
scientific community," id. (statement of Jonathan King, Associate Professor of
Biology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Member, Genetics and Society Group,
Science for the People), and "a relic from the 18th and 19th centuries." Id. at 54
(statement of Harold P. Green, Professor of Law, The National Law Center, George
Washington University).
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have enjoyed a high degree of public acceptance and respect
because of the important contributions they have made,
particularly in areas such as the prevention and treatment of
disease and the exploration of space. 2
The public image of scientists has tended to be a positive
one; each of us no doubt can conjure up an image, formed or
fostered by television or film depiction, of the white-coated and
slightly distracted scientist squirreled away in a musty uni-
versity laboratory thinking great thoughts, quite unaffected by
the mundane passions of the real world. Given that image, it
is shocking to contemplate acts like the fabrication of research
results and plagiarism.
Yet, one by one our cultural heroes have become tarnished
in the public eye. From Watergate to Wall Street, formerly
esteemed segments of professional life in this country have
suffered a precipitous decline in reputation and public confi-
dence. 3 Professions we might have viewed in the years gone
by as of unassailable integrity have come to be viewed in a
more jaded, and some would say more realistic, light. Scien-
tists, however, to a large extent have escaped this degree of
cynicism, perhaps because of the relatively lesser incidence of
misconduct by scientists, or perhaps because of the relatively
greater obscurity of such misconduct. Whatever the cause, our
favorable impression of scientists has tended to prevail despite
significant instances of misconduct.
While reasonable persons might differ about the frequency
of abuse, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the
potential for abuse is. inconsequential or that the seriousness
of the possible consequences of scientific misconduct does not
merit concern. Although scientific research may be a profes-
sion that tends to attract people committed to truth-finding,
scientists are subject to the same-day-to-day pressures of the
work world as anyone else, even in academic settings.8 4
82. See id. at 21 (statement of Ruth S. Hanif, Senior Research Associate and
Study Director, Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences) ("The Sputnik
era reinforced the trends toward increased research and technology and the prestige
that accrued to the scientist-researcher.").
83. For example, Oliver North was fined for his participation in the Iran-Contra
Affair, David Johnston, North, Spared Prison, Gets $150,000 Fine and Probation for
His Iran-Contra Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1989, at Al, and Michael Milken
received a prison sentence for his crimes related to securities trading. Kurt
Eichenwald, Milken Gets 10 Years for Wall Street Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1990,
at Al.
84. As William S. Beck noted:
Likewise, science cannot be regarded as a thing apart, to be studied, admired,
or ignored. It is a vital part of our culture, our culture is part of it, it
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For example, the notion is sometimes advanced that the
scientific profession by its nature attracts (and keeps) persons
who by nature are truth-seekers, skeptical and critical in their
thinking.85 There are, however, a number of forces that
might work against this hypothesized self-selection for
honesty. For example, even if the hypothesis is true, the
explosion of the number of scientists in the past fifty years86
may have had some diluting effect on the general qualifica-
tions of scientists. Additionally, just like the attraction of
truth-finding, the attractions of attention, of accolade, and
even of monetary reward for discovery, are also forces at work
in the self-selection process.87
permeates our thinking, and its continued separateness from what is fondly
called "the humanities" is a preposterous practical joke on all thinking
men....
In the pages that follow, we will speak of the nature of science, of the
scientist, of ideas, and of life. It is my intention to connect science with the
rest of our experience by interweaving the notions of biological thought with
aspects of history and the philosophical and cultural climate of each age...
and by showing the scientist to be a human being, not a wizard, demon, or
lovable white-haired old man. He is not a caricature or a stereotype but a man
who faces difficult problems (for a variety of personal reasons), who succeeds
and fails, and who behaves as nobly or erratically as his neighbor-sometimes
more so, sometimes less so.
WILLIAM S. BECK, MODERN SCIENCE AND THE NATURE OF LIFE 5-6 (1957).
85. Some have argued to the contrary, that is, that there is a powerful potential
for self-deception and gullibility among scientists:
Expectancy leads to self-deception, and self-deception leads to the
propensity to be deceived by others. The great scientific hoaxes, such as the
Beringer case and the Piltdown man ... demonstrate the extremes of
gullibility to which some scientists may be led by their desire to believe.
Indeed, professional magicians claim that scientists, because of their
confidence in their own objectivity, are easier to deceive than other people.
BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 108.
86. As the New York Times reported, "The National Science Foundation notes
that from 1976 to 1986, the number of scientists in the United States more than
doubled, rising from 959,500 to 2,186,300." William J. Broad, Science Can't Keep Up
With Flood of New Journals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1988, at C1.
87. As Lawrence S. Kubie notes:
Pure research and the more abstract forms of art and literature. . . dissect the
units of experience, rearrange the pieces, juggle them around, and juxtapose
them out of context. The outcome of this process cannot fail to bear the
imprint of multiple projections of buried and often predominantly unconscious
aspects of the personality of the abstract artist, or of the basic scientist.
... In applied research external pressures predominate among the sources
of distortion. These are manifested in the influence of the pursuit of money,
status, and fame, in the immediate alleviation of anxiety, in the urgent
demand to satisfy immediate practical, commercial, military, or humanistic
383
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Scientists suffer the same "publish-or-perish" tenure
process as other academics.8" This pressure also exists in
the grant process, in which awards are based in part on the
"productivity" of the researcher,89 and is exacerbated by
the pressure to generate research funds, which increasingly
are available only for directed research. Those involved in
this endeavor professionally say that many hours of their
time are spent applying for research grants and "papering
the file" for the grants they already have, rather than
conducting studies and experiments and analyzing the
results of those studies.9 °
purposes, etc. For example, in the entire field of applied scientific research I
know of no external source of distortion greater than is the eagerness of the
physician to find a cure, an eagerness which derives simultaneously from
social pressures, from humanitarian impulses, and from more deeply
egocentric needs. (Freud commented long since on the unconscious sadistic
purposes which may at times masquerade in this disguise.)
In pure research, on the other hand (as in abstract art), the major sources
of distortion are internal; and the products of the creative processes bear to a
more unique degree the imprint of buried and unresolved neurotic problems.
LAWRENCE S. KUBIE, NEUROTIC DISTORTION OF THE CREATIVE PROCESS 94-95 (1958);
see also Lawrence S. Kubie, Some Unsolved Problems of the Scientific Career, 41 AM.
SCIENTIST 596-613 (1953) (discussing neurotic and socio-economic forces which
influence the scientist's emotional life and intellectual career).
88. Patricia K. Woolf disagrees, arguing that, while there is pressure to publish,
'supporting evidence for the allegation that only quantity counts is almost always
anecdotal," and the few studies "that do exist show that unduly prolific publishing
is in fact not widespread." Patricia K. Woolf, "Pressure to Publish" Is a Lame Excuse
for Scientific Fraud, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. A52 (Sept. 23, 1987). Woolf maintains
that "'[pressure to publish' is a mechanical metaphor" and that "[t]he excuse of
'pressure' is offered in the belief that it somehow softens the charge, and to a certain
extent exonerates the malefactor by picturing him as a victim of a difficult situation
rather than as the perpetrator of an offense." Id.
89. See, e.g., Leigh Van Valen, Dishonesty and Grants, 261 NATURE 2 (1976).
90. Dr. Suzanne Oparil described the grant application process:
I would like to emphasize one thing, if I could, that no one has really
touched on yet. That is how exhausting the grant preparation process per se
is and how expensive it is. As director of this program, I have spent most of my
time since November 1983 first getting our people together for our competitive
renewal, which was submitted in May 1984, and getting them ready for the site
visit, which was held in November 1984. This entailed numerous rehearsals,
paring down of projects, budgetary negotiations, and so on.
The actual grant application was about 1,200 pages long, single-spaced. The
estimated cost for its preparation is of the order of $100,000.
NIH Research Funding: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-60 (1985) (statement of Dr.
Suzanne Oparil, Director, Hypertension Research Program, University of Alabama
at B'irmingham).
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Another problem with the research environment is the
enlargement and depersonalization of research facilities, with
a corresponding dilution of the responsibility of any one person
for any particular phase of the research project.91 The role
of the person awarded a research grant thus can take on the
aura of a manager rather than a researcher, a rainmaker
rather than a scientist, a promoter rather than a scholar. As
research facilities and staffs get bigger, a lead researcher
spends less time directly supervising the personnel, the
direction of the research, and the interpretation of the
investigative results.92
More generally, the increase in directed research may have
a negative impact. Although scientific research historically
has been conducted for the general growth of scientific
knowledge and understanding of the way the world oper-
ates,93 more and more research in the modern era is directed;
91. This problem is a by-product of the infusion of large amounts of federal
funds into scientific research. As Dr. Ernest Borek, a microbiology professor at the
University of Colorado Medical Center, notes: "'Ambitious young scientists in large
laboratories become especially tempted because often they are not properly super-
vised. As large grants for medical research become available, entrepreneurial ability
in some cases was added to scientific ability in securing funds, laboratories and
research associates. The researcher became an employer.'" HIXSON, supra note 13,
at 160-61.
92. Heinz Schuler offers the following observation:
One could also view the development of guidelines as a consequence of the
rapid growth of the institution of science. Its size and complexity have now
reached a stage at which it no longer seems adequate or even feasible to rely
on informal regulation or to expect implicit standards to be accepted as
obvious. The growth of the institution called science makes it harder to survey
and regulate by means of informal agreement, and perhaps the mechanisms
of socialization are no longer as definite and coherent as they once were.
SCHULER, supra note 54, at 167.
93. Basic research generally refers to research about the validity of any given
scientific hypothesis posed by the researcher, regardless of whether the research has
any immediate practical application. For example, see the definitions of basic
research included in the regulations for the Department of Defense, 32 C.F.R. § 272.2
(1991) ("Basic research is that type of research which is directed toward increase of
knowledge in science. It is research where the primary aim of the investigator is a
fuller understanding of the subject under study."), and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, 14 C.F.R. § 1260.107(c) (1992) ("Systematic, intensive study
directed toward greater knowledge or understanding of the subject studie[d]."). Such
information, of course, provides the building blocks for applied or directed research.
The field of biomedical research exemplifies the blurring of the distinction between
basic and applied research. The research often is directed toward solving the mystery
of a particular disease, and so may be viewed as applied rather than basic because
the ultimate product could well be a marketable prevention, treatment, or cure.
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that is, modern research is targeted ultimately at the achieve-
ment of a particular scientific goal, such as the eradication of
a particular disease. In the modern era of scientific research,
a great deal of research is paid for with federal dollars-$21
billion in fiscal year 1990 alone. 4 Thus, the federal govern-
ment has subsidized extensively the war on cancer.95
Recently, the federal effort to conquer the AIDS virus has
occupied national attention.s
Some scientists argue that the process of directing scientific
research is inherently unscientific, because it is impossible to
channel and compel discovery and knowledge in this fashion.
Directing scientific research is also unscientific, some argue,
because it ignores the benefits of increasing general under-
standing and knowledge on many different fronts.97
Directed research funnels many dollars and scientists into
narrow areas of research, creating vacuums in other areas
and a generally uneven distribution of scientific resources.
94. In fiscal year 1990, the federal government planned to spend approximately
$21 billion in basic and applied research. More than $7 billion was planned for NIH
research, and approximately 62 percent of those funds was to go to colleges and
universities. See Conflicts Hearings, supra note 52, at 132.
95. See HIXSON, supra note 13, at 157-82 (setting forth a critical evaluation of
the government's policies on spending for cancer research).
96. See Conflicts Hearings, supra note 52, at 107 (testimony of Richard
Kusserow, Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services) ("For AIDS
research alone, funding has reached $1 billion a year and is expected to reach $4
billion by 1990."). Other examples of directed or applied research include research
conducted to support applications to the federal government for approval of the
marketing of certain commercial products.
97. Dr. Howard H. Hiatt, referring to Bruce Ames, who developed an effective
and inexpensive test for the mutagenic and carcinogenic power of a substance, notes:
Perhaps the most important development in our attempts to identify
environmental carcinogens in the last couple of decades, as everybody in this
room knows, is the test Bruce Ames came upon as a result of his research in
Salmonella, where he was looking at the genetics and biochemistry of the
synthesis of amino acids. I don't know who funded that project. I suspect it
wasn't the Cancer Institute. It had no apparent relevance to cancer at the
time, and surely he had no interest in that project as a means of helping solve
the problem of cancer. There would have been no way to predict the ultimate
usefulness of that information. All one knew was that here was a first-rate
scientist undertaking a study of a serious problem. The dilemma to which I
was referring is that if we insist, as I think we increasingly do, that research
spin off immediate developments, we risk a lessened emphasis on this kind of
work, at a time when our knowledge of fundamental life processes is extremely
limited.
Biomedical Research, supra note 81, at 30 (statement of Howard H. Hiatt, M.D.,
Dean, School of Public Health, Harvard Medical School).
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Directing research also can generate considerable pressure to
produce tangible and marketable results in a relatively short
period of time.98
Another characteristic of modern research is the great
commercial value of some research. The uproar over cold
fusion emphasizes the potential monetary value of scientific
research.99 Who would not want the patent rights to a drug
that is effective against the symptoms of AIDS? The possi-
bility of receiving patent rights and royalties °° may create
a potential profit motive in what used to be a "purely aca-
demic" endeavor.
Finally, one needs to take account of the pressure for
priority in discovery-the desire to be the first to learn
something.' Little, if any, benefit accrues to the scientist
who reinvents the wheel. Thus, there is pressure to achieve
novelty in one's ideas and discoveries. While this pressure
may always have been present, it is magnified by the surge
in the number of scientists engaged in research in the modern
era, the compression of timetables brought about by techno-
logical advances in research equipment, research techniques,
and in reporting results of research, and the amounts of
money at stake (both research dollars and the possible
commercial value of the discovery).
98. As Stanley Jones testified:
[P]eople in general expect and believe that medical science can do
something to relieve the terrible problems of their human condition .... A
good deal of the correspondence [from constituents to Congress] also insists
that if only there were more money, more time invested, then a cure would be
found and medical science could in fact deliver us from such trials. That
conviction is strong enough that the American public is willing and ready to
invest enormous amounts of money in medical research.
Id. at 83 (statement of Stanley Jones, Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate).
99. The news media reported that some scientists have concluded that the data
supporting the claimed discovery of cold fusion were fabricated. William J. Broad,
Cold-Fusion Claim Is Faulted On Ethics as Well as Science 'Invented,' Scientists Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1991, § 1, at 1 (reporting the conclusions of Frank Close, FRANK
CLOSE, Too HOT TO HANDLE (1991), that the data were fabricated).
100. Exec. Order No. 10,096, 3 C.F.R. 292 (1949-53) created patent policies for
federally funded research; 45 C.F.R. §§ 6.0-.4; 8.0-.8 (1990) provides current policies.
101. A controversy related to competing efforts to isolate the AIDS virus provides
some insight into the struggle for priority. Marlene Cimons, Scrutiny of AIDS
Research Widens, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1990, at A13.
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These aspects of scientific research may contribute both to
the pressure to produce and a feeling of alienation from one's
work and its implications. These pressures may in turn
create an impetus to falsify research results or engage in
other sorts of misconduct, or at least may detract from the
restraints on engaging in such conduct that might otherwise
adhere. 102
While these conditions might be seen as a breeding ground
for problems, the conventional wisdom is that any problems
are addressed adequately by the profession itself. The claim
is that the scientific community polices itself. 3
A common form of internal control is the practice of obtain-
ing a critical evaluation of research results submitted to scien-
tific journals for publication. Scientific journals frequently
102. But see the statement of Dr. Ronald Lamont-Havers, Director of Research,
Massachusetts General Hospital, in Fraud in Biomedical Research, supra note 21, at
66-67 (responding to a congressional inquiry into whether having experimental work
done by proxy and competition for shrinking grant funds had altered the research
environment). Dr. Lamont-Havers took the position that such factors were of great
concern and contributed to tensions within the research community, but "in
themselves ... probably play little part in the perpetration of fraud in science." Id.
at 66. He added:
I know of no evidence that competition for major awards in science has played
a significant, if any part, in the deliberate distortion of research data....
Certainly, the "publish or perish" pressures.., are real. There is also no
doubt that investigators may rush into print before experiments have been
repeated or confirmed in order to establish priority. Such data hastily
disseminated may prove to be wrong when subsequently checked and the
experiments repeated. These types of publications are usually taken for what
they are, as preliminary reports.
The reputation of the investigator is influenced by how often he resorts to
this type of announcement. Error in such publications are [sic] not fraudulent,
but misdirected enthusiasm, and such premature publication is generally
frowned upon, although certainly practiced.
Id. at 67.
See also Schmaus, supra note 8, at 105-06, citing an instance of admitted
fabrication of data on the part of Robert J. Gullis of the Max Planck Institute for
Biochemistry in West Germany. Gullis' printed retraction indicates that his motiva-
tion in falsifying data "was that [he] was so convinced of [his] ideas that [he] simply
put them down on paper; it was not because of the tremendous importance of
published papers to the career of a scientist." Robert J. Gullis, Statement, 265
NATURE 764 (1977); see also supra note 88 and accompanying text (arguing publishing
pressures are an unlikely reason for fraud). But see BROAD & WADE, supra note 3,
at 151-52 (concluding that Gullis' misconduct was at least partially caused by
pressures to publish).
103. See, e.g., Fraud in Biomedical Research, supra note 21, at 11-13 (testimony
of Dr. Philip Handler, President, National Academy of Sciences); KOHN, supra note
3, at 196-99.
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submit manuscripts to a number of qualified scientists for
their opinions about the soundness of the work. °4 Once a
piece is published, critical evaluation by the scientific com-
munity at large is at least possible. Another form of peer
review is the practice that government agencies follow of
submitting research proposals or research results to qualified
scientists for evaluation of the soundness of the proposal or
the work."0 5
In theory, such review prevents researchers from publishing
implausible research results. Evaluation by other researchers
after publication also deters outright fabrication because
validity of the research results will be questioned if the other
researchers cannot replicate the author's results.
There are, however, problems with the theory. To the
extent it is premised on replication, it has been argued both
that replication of research is a hit-or-miss proposition and
that it does not actually occur as often or as predictably as
proponents of the theory might lead one to believe.'
Recent celebrated cases of scientific fraud were not uncovered
because of efforts to duplicate research or through any other
peer review process. 0 7  In any case, detecting misconduct
through peer review wastes time, scientific resources, and
104. For a description of the peer review process, see Thomas S. Burack, Of
Reliable Science: Scientific Peer Review, Federal Regulatory Agencies, and the Courts,
7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 27, 30-35 (1987).
105. Id.
106. See BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 86-87; Engler et al., supra note 35, at
1385-86. Confirmation of the earlier research does not necessarily produce any
immediate benefit for the second researcher; the inability to confirm the earlier
research is not, in and of itself, significant enough to ensure publication of negative
results, since such an inability may be the result of procedural errors by the second
researcher. As Theodore X. Barber notes:
Failure to replicate results of a previous investigator, using the same method
but a different sample, is generally of questionable value. A single failure may
merely testify to sampling errors or to the conclusion that one of the two
samples had unique characteristics responsible for the reported effect, or the
lack of effect. An author can resolve the issue when he reports several failures
with a range of samples. A single failure is too equivocal to justify publication
on its merits alone.
BARBER, supra note 44, at 33 (footnotes omitted) (quoting PUBLICATION MANUAL OF
THE ADA 21-22 (1974)).
107. It has been argued, however, that the definitions of "peer review" and
.replication" used in this context are too narrow to capture accurately the efficacy of
these processes as deterrents. PROJECT ON SCIENTIFIC FRAUD, supra note 3, at 61-65.
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money to duplicate bad research. Thus, we must focus on
deterring misconduct before it occurs, rather than catching it
afterward.
Supporters of the internal review process argue that the
system creates a deterrent because no researcher would risk
losing credibility and position by fabricating or misreporting
research results when she knows that she can or will be
caught."10 Yet, significant instances of misconduct have
occurred despite the existence of the review system. In
addition, this view suggests that scientists who, oblivious of
their interests, engage in wrongful conduct must be deranged
because rational scientists would be deterred from wrongdoing
by the threat of review. 10 9
108. Dr. Ronald Lamont-Havers supports this view:
The investigator is always well aware that if his work is found to be bad
science with unreproducible data, then his career as a scientist is finished.
The rational individual-and I stress rational individual-knows that the
deliberate falsification of data to fit a given hypothesis will inevitably, sooner
or later be found out by others who seek to repeat the findings or who can
critically judge the experiment. Once the suspicion of lack of good science is
raised, future endeavors are scrutinized with even greater care.
Fraud in Biomedical Research, supra note 21, at 66 (statement of Dr. Ronald Lamont-
Havers, Director of Research, Massachusetts General Hospital).
109. As Dr. Philip Handler states:
Accordingly, one can only judge the rare such acts that have come to light
as psychopathic behavior originating in minds that made very bad judgments-
ethics aside-minds which in at least this one regard may be considered as
having been temporarily deranged.
Id. at 12 (statement of Dr. Philip Handler, President, National Academy of Sciences).
Broad and Wade, however, challenge this theory, at least as applied to the case of
William Summerlin, discussed supra notes 13-21 and accompanying test:
Why did Summerlin stoop to deceit? The explanation seized on by adminis-
trators at Sloan-Kettering was that the man had gone out of his mind. Lewis
Thomas, president of the center, announced in a formal statement of May 24:
"I have concluded that the most rational explanation for Dr. Summerlin's
recent performance is that he has been suffering from an emotional distur-
bance of such a nature that he had not been fully responsible for the actions
he has taken nor the representations he has made. Accordingly, it has been
agreed that the Center will provide Dr. Summerlin with a period of medical
leave on full salary ($40,000], beginning now, for up to 1 year, to enable him
to obtain the rest and professional care which his condition may require." It
is a recurring theme. Episodes of deceit are often said to be caused by
insanity, at least according to administrators where the deed was performed.
BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 155-56.
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Yet, the criminal law rejects this theory with respect to any
other antisocial conduct that is treated criminally. Engaging
in criminal conduct does not establish that one is legally
insane or not culpable for one's conduct.1 ' While one might
attempt to argue that a scientist's loss is greater than that of
most criminals, the argument is unsound, both because it
ignores the fact that individuals with a great deal to lose do
engage in criminal conduct, and because it is hopelessly elitist.
Finally, the deterrence argument assumes that the honest
scientist is willing (or at least is perceived by dishonest
scientists as willing) to police other scientists, and will deem
it in her best interest to expose any discovered misconduct.
This assumption, however, ignores the personal aversion and
discomfort people feel about making accusations against their
colleagues. It also ignores the difficult situations in which
"whistle-blowers" seem to find themselves after bringing to
light the possibility of wrongdoing."'
B. Penological Justification for Criminal Sanctions
Regardless of whether the internal mechanisms of science
provide protection against wrongdoing, criminal sanctions
Similar discontent with this theory is reflected in a letter to the editor of Science
regarding Summerlin:
As Thomas Szasz pointed out long ago, the label of mental illness or emotional
disturbance is more and more frequently applied to explain behavior that is
not normative. Yet, as Szasz has also argued, the reliance on such a label to
explain behavior represents an abnegation of moral responsibility .... This
raises the question of why Summerlin should be let off so easily, for he
violated one of the principal mores of the profession. It seems to me that
professional scientists are too quick to duck the real issue here. They seem too
willing, on the most tenuous basis, to excuse the behavior of "a col-
league"-even one who has broken their most sacred rule.
Bernard L. Faber, 185 Sci. 734 (1974) (letter to the editor).
110. The Model Penal Code states that 'the terms 'mental disease or defect' do
not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-
social conduct." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
111. See, e.g., Scientific Fraud and Misconduct and the Federal Response:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-65 (1988) [hereinafter Scientific Fraud] (statement of Robert L.
Sprague, recounting his experience in exposing wrongdoings by Stephen Breuning).
The negative experiences of Sprague and other whistleblowers are described in
PROJECT ON SCIENTIFIC FRAUD, supra note 3, at 19-23.
WINTER 1992]
392 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 25:2
would provide additional deterrence. Criminal penalties,
under traditional hypotheses, enhance deterrence, and operate
to condemn the conduct in question as evil.112  Many
problems that are treated criminally are also the subject of
other nonpenal deterrents and controls.1 3 The same consid-
erations of deterrence and condemnation apply to some forms
of scientific misconduct, particularly the falsification of
research results. The theory of deterrence is especially
relevant to white-collar crime because it is characterized by
actors who are well informed and less inclined to act on
impulse. Particularly in a small community of actors, like the
community of researchers, word can be expected to spread
quickly when stringent repercussions follow wrongdoing."'
The initial reasons for considering criminal sanctions in the
interest of deterrence and condemnation are the nature and
degree of societal harm that can result when scientific mis-
conduct, particularly the false reporting of research results,
affects the integrity of the research process. Fraudulent
research wastes grant funds and other resources, 15 includ-
ing the time of researchers who make futile efforts to
112. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
113. No one, for example, would argue seriously that drunk driving should not
be treated as a criminal law problem because the possibility of getting in an accident
is deterrent enough for this conduct and anyone who nonetheless engages in the
conduct must be deranged. Drunk driving is a criminal offense because some may
be deterred by the existence of criminal penalties and because the conduct is morally
wrong and potentially hurtful.
114. See, e.g., United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
The court addressed the defendant's argument that he should not be incarcerated for
the purpose of general deterrence:
But the whole business, defendant argues further, is guesswork; we are by
no means certain that deterrence "works." The position is somewhat
overstated; there is, in fact, some reasonably "scientific" evidence for the
efficacy of criminal sanctions as deterrents, at least as against some kinds of
crimes. Moreover, the time is not yet here when all we can "know" must be
quantifiable and digestible by computers. The shared wisdom of generations
teaches meaningfully, if somewhat amorphously, that the utilitarians have a
point; we do, indeed, lapse often into rationality and act to seek pleasure and
avoid pain. It would be better, to be sure, if we had more certainty and
precision. Lacking these comforts, we continue to include among our working
hypotheses a belief (with some concrete evidence in its support) that crimes
like those in this case-deliberate, purposeful, continuing, non-impulsive, and
committed for profit-are among those most likely to be generally deterrable
by sanctions most shunned by those exposed to temptation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
115. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
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duplicate fraudulent research. In addition, future research
efforts may be misdirected because others may rely upon the
falsified data either to pursue a line of research that otherwise
would not be warranted, or forego a particular line of research
that may be fruitful." 6  Immeasurable, of course, is the
human suffering that attends either incorrect treatment
premised on false research results, or absence of treatment




A terrible cost associated with this type of misbehavior is
that the hypothesis supported by fraudulent research may be
true, but it becomes virtually taboo because of the notoriety
that a researcher's use of false data brings to it. Future
scientific endeavor into a fruitful area of research may thus be
slowed or even stopped for some period of time out of fear of
being associated with a tainted research subject."1
8
116. In the prosecution of Stephen Breuning, the government observed in its
memorandum on sentencing that "a number of people have had their careers
sever[e]ly disrupted because they had relied upon the representations [in publica-
tions] of Stephen E. Breuning." Gov't Memorandum on Sentencing at 9, United
States v. Breuning, No. K-88-0135 (D. Md. Nov. 8, 1988). By being associated with
a wrongdoer, coauthors of a researcher who falsified data may also suffer a decline
in reputation. In some cases, the coauthors might be seen as having some culpability
for failing to detect the falsification, even if they did not directly participate in the
acts of deception. See Engler et al., supra note 35, at 1386.
117. It is sometimes argued that scientific fraud exists only on the fringes of
science, in areas of little interest or significance, and that this accounts for its
success. That is, the more significant or controversial the claimed findings, the less
likely that fraud will occur or go undetected; conversely, the more likely that fraud
will go undetected, the less likely it is that the fraud relates to a matter of true
scientific significance. See Engler et al., supra note 35, at 1388. "'Does it really
matter,' the cynic asks, 'if a cunning faker gets away with producing hundreds of
papers that nobody reads?'" Id. Thus, some instances, such as the misconduct of
Stephen Breuning, discussed supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text and infra notes
136-42 and accompanying text, involve extensions or confirmations of existing
research and others, such as that of Elias Alsabti, discussed supra notes 22-23 and
accompanying text, involve obscure publications of little interest. See, e.g., Fraud in
Biomedical Research, supra note 21, at 66 (statement of Dr. Ronald Lamont-Havers)
(noting that research that is considered relatively unimportant may not be
investigated for a long time).
Even if this claim were true (and the Summerlin case gives some reason to doubt
it, since his research related to an important and controversial area), it is not
inevitably mitigating. Certainly, if a project is significant enough to fund, it is
significant enough to police. Moreover, since the development of scientific knowledge
takes an unpredictable path, it is impossible to state with certainty the importance
certain research ultimately would have.
118. Interestingly, this possibility seems to have been true of the work of William
Summerlin, supra notes 13-21. As Lois Wingerson commented:
Although Summerlin admits 'touching up" a skin graft on a mouse to make it
look healthy when it was being rejected, he had in fact stumbled on a
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Reporting false research also spews useless information into
an already daunting body of scientific literature that must be
searched and absorbed by scientists attempting to keep up
with current developments." 9  Until recently the scientific
community has not had any sustained method for notifying its
members that a particular article has been discredited or
withdrawn. Either the volume of problem articles or the
attention drawn to the subject apparently has resulted in the
creation of several ways to learn about discredited or with-
drawn literature. 2 ° The lag time between discovery of and
dissemination of information about the problems with reported
research, however, still may permit harm to occur.
phenomenon-something so unexpected and simple that it seemed ludicrous
at the time-which turns out to be valid after all. It is now supported by
considerable research from reputable scientists, and has sparked a theory that
has helped to transform our understanding of rejection.
Not surprisingly, both [Paul Lacy and Kevin Lafferty, researchers following
up on Summerlin's work] made the discovery accidentally, while doing
something else. After 1974, who would have asked for grant money for the
express purpose of studying the organ transplantability of skin taken from
culture?
Even now, such an offer [of a grant to follow up on Summerlin's work] is a
fantasy. Most of the researchers in Summerlin's wake have not even dared to
dream of asking for grant money for this work, let alone being asked to do it.
Sometimes they have had to put up with a good bit of twitting for doing it on
the side. "It was an extremely unpopular area, so we told no one what we
were doing," Lacy recalls. "We already had a grant from a foundation, and we
informed them we wanted to try this, and luckily they said OK. Otherwise,
if we had applied for the funds before we had done any work we wouldn't have
gotten past base one."
As a staff member at the Australian National University, Lafferty was
lucky to be able to pursue his theory without asking for grants; he agrees there
would have been trouble getting one. However, he did have problems getting
published. "I sent the first paper to Nature, and they wrote back saying they
were fascinated with the work," he remembers. "They had no scientific
criticisms, but said they didn't see how they could persuade people to believe
it."
Lois Wingerson, William Summerlin: Was He Right All Along?, 89 NEW SCI. 527, 527
(1981); see also HIXSON, supra note 13, at 66-68.
119. There are more than 40,000 scientific journals worldwide, publishing in
excess of one million articles per year. Broad, supra note 86, at Cl, Cll ("Experts
estimate that the scientific literature now doubles every 10 to 15 years."). See BROAD
& WADE, supra note 3, at 53-54, 56, 57. Self-interest prevents me from waxing too
poetic on the evils of useless publication.
120. Retraction policies of scientific journals are discussed in Fraud in
Biomedical Research, supra note 21, at 346-47 (statement of Dr. Patricia Woolf,
Science and Technology Project, Princeton University), and in PROJECT ON SCIENTIFIC
FRAUD, supra note 3, at 76-78. In addition, a new publication, ACCOUNTABILITY IN
RESEARCH, has been started. CONFLICTS REPORT, supra note 32, at 6.
WINTER 1992] Scientific Misconduct
Perhaps the most truly damaging aspect of scientific mis-
conduct is its potential for undermining trust. 121 Research-
ers not only rely upon each other's reported results, but the
willingness to fund research may depend on the perceived
integrity of the scientific profession. When trust is a neces-
sary feature of a system, it is especially important to discover
and condemn those whose behavior casts doubt upon the
integrity of the operation. Thus, conduct such as product
tampering is punished (and heavily so) even if no injury
results. 
122
The damage that can be caused by scientific misconduct
certainly makes it a candidate for criminal sanctions. This
harm is certainly no less serious from a penological point of
view than shoplifting or forging a social security check.
123
Yet, some may hesitate to prosecute the scientist on the theory
that a person of this group who engages in misconduct related
to research is simply not a "criminal."'24 The misrepresenta-
tion of research results might be dismissed as mere "fudging,"
not unlike the kind of glossing and embellishing that attends
much of life's activities. 125  But fudging is just a softer word
121. Fraud in Biomedical Research, supra note 21, at 178 (statement of Rep.
Robert S. Walker).
122. See 18 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988), which criminalizes various acts of product
tampering. The statutorily authorized penalties vary depending upon the degree of
harm caused by the conduct, but include a maximum sentence of ten years under
§ 1365(a) and three years under § 1365(b), even absent a showing of specific harm.
In addition, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines impose rather stiff sentences even
absent harm, although they authorize an increased sentence if death, extreme
psychological injury, or substantial property damage or monetary loss results. FED.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES §§ 2Nl.1, 2N1.2, 2N1.3 (1987) [hereinafter SENTENCING
GUIDELINES].
123. See, e.g., United States v. Cavada, 821 F.2d 1046, 1047, 1049 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 932 (1987) (affirming a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 495 for forging
a social security check in the amount of $136.66; the maximum penalty for the felony
was ten years incarceration and the defendant was sentenced to two years); United
States v. Hill, 579 F.2d 480, 481 (8th Cir. 1978) (affirming a conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 495 for forging a social security check in the amount of $306.20; the
defendant was sentenced to six months' incarceration).
124. As Dr. Patricia Woolf testified:
[T]hese events of falsification should not be interpreted to mean that scientists
who falsify data are trying to fleece the public. Though it is clear to the
academic research community, it may not be as clear to the general public that
these events are different in kind from overt embezzlement or culpable
mismanagement or misappropriation of research funds.
Fraud in Biomedical Research, supra note 21, at 344 (testimony of Dr. Patricia Woolf,
Science and Technology Project, Princeton University).
125. A statutory recognition of the distinction between fraud and puffing is found
in the Model Penal Code's approach to the crime of theft by deception, which provides
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for lying; the quality of the conduct does not improve with the
class of person engaging in it or the complexity of the context
in which it is done. Moreover, many situations in which one
might be tempted to engage in glossing and embellishing do
not carry the price tag or societal implications of scientific
misconduct.
Likewise, there may be an impetus, born of the reluctance
to ruin the life of someone like a scientist, to look for excuses
for the conduct-"The poor guy worked under such pressure to
achieve results"; "There was such great publication pressure";
"The pressure to get grants was unbelievable"; "He must have
just snapped." But when speculating about reasons for the
conduct, one ought not fail to consider a reason that applies to
many people who are prosecuted-the individual simply did
not have the moral fiber to do the right thing when temptation
was placed in her path or pressure was exerted upon her.
Educated or not, middle class or low, engaging in misrepresen-
tation to get what you want or spare yourself an unpleasant-
ness is a basic feature of many criminal acts.'26 For better
or worse, we live in a society in which the pressures of poverty
are not considered an acceptable reason to steal food or money,
nor is the pressure of loneliness or neglect an acceptable
that '[t]he term 'deceive' does not ... include falsity as to matters having no
pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons
in the group addressed." MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Likewise, cases under the mail fraud statute have required that false statements in
sales pitches go to the basis for the bargain before liability will attach. See, e.g.,
United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1182 (2d Cir. 1970).
126. Similar views were expressed in a letter to the editor of Science regarding
William Summerlin:
We know about deviance in almost every sphere of life; why should we assume,
as we do, that such behavior does not occur among professional scientists?
What makes the scientist immune from vulnerability to deviance? We seem
to take it for granted that the efforts of scientists are so much more important,
their motives so pure, that under these conditions, altering one's data cannot
occur.... We are naive to believe that dishonesty in research in [sic] unique
and aberrant. The rewards are just too tempting: prestige, ego enhancement,
promotion, and, as in the case of Summerlin, a $40,000 salary and a home in
Darien, Connecticut. Mighty tempting rewards for success. Not only are the
rewards tempting but, while the process of socialization in graduate school
may give credence to veracity, it nonetheless emphasizes success. The
emphasis on scientific success creates a severe strain on the practicing
researcher, who is torn between the norms established for the process of
research and the penultimate rewards for success. Under these conditions
deviance is likely to occur in any group, even among scientists.
Faber, supra note 109, at 734.
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reason to engage in criminal acts to gain status or attention.
This being the case, one may legitimately conclude that the
pressures of a lucrative and prestigious job that a scientist
voluntarily undertakes are not an acceptable reason to steal,
in effect, the taxpayers' money by obtaining it under false
pretenses or to steal undeserved recognition by falsely claiming
credit for research. 127
Taking this position, however, does not require that one deny
that there may be certain obstacles to investigation and
prosecution that might not be found in more mundane contexts.
For example, one might question whether nonscientists are
capable of understanding enough about scientific matters to
make the factual determinations relevant to a criminal offense
sanctioning scientific misconduct. Unlike the readily under-
standable facts relevant to resolving garden-variety crimes,
scientific misconduct may involve some extremely complicated
facts not within the understanding of the average person. This
127. An interesting contrast is provided by the views, similar but expressed in
a different context, of a court in response to a white-collar defendant's claim that his
sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment and denied him equal protection
of the laws. See Browder v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 1042, 1043 (D. Or. 1975),
affd, 544 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1976). The judge had sentenced the defendant to four
ten-year terms and one five-year term, to run consecutively, upon the defendant's
plea of guilty to charges of transporting and pledging stolen securities valued at more
than $500,000. The court remarked:
The basis for petitioner's claim is a study he conducted of 100 cases
involving similar white collar crimes. If accurate, his study contains startling
statistics. Of the 100 defendants studied, 20% received fines, probation, or
suspended sentences only for acts involving $350,000,000 or more. The others
studied received light sentences for a variety of swindles in which the public
became victim to members of the Mafia, labor union officials, mayors,
attorneys, stock brokers, business executives, bankers, a former state Attorney
General, a governor, a federal judge, and others.
I cannot reconcile a policy of sending poorly educated burglars from the
ghetto to jail when men in the highest positions of public trust and authority
receive judicial coddling when they are caught fleecing their constituencies....
If we are to justify imprisonment for the rest, it must be on the grounds of
punishment or deterrence. And if this is our premise, the white collar criminal
must come to expect equal or greater treatment than the common, non-violent
thief. The consequences of a white collar property crime tend to reach a higher
magnitude in direct proportion to the level of status and power held by the
criminal involved.
Edward Browder was convicted of pledging over $500,000 worth of stolen
securities. He concedes his guilt for those crimes. The fact that they were
accomplished by means of wit and charm rather than a burglar's tools does not
minimize the damage done to the public.
Id. at 1046-47.
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concern, however, can be-'addressed through the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, for there will be cases in which the gist
of the wrongdoing is comprehensible to nonscientists despite the
fact that the misconduct arose in a complex scientific context.
To operate on the assumption that no jury could understand
facts related to scientific research would effectively create an a
priori immunity for scientists who engage in misconduct in
their research.
Another legitimate reason for caution is the recognition that
scarce research dollars will be diverted from funding research
to pay for the investigation of scientific misconduct. 128 Thus,
it might be argued that the reliance upon criminal sanctions
will lead to the creation of an investigational bureaucracy that
ultimately will decrease the amount of funds spent on research.
The cost of vigorously investigating and prosecuting this type
of misconduct is a legitimate factor to consider. Because grant
funds are so scarce, however, a serious commitment is essential
to ensure that no one abuses the grant process or the scientific
process it supports. The existence of criminal sanctions that
are taken seriously is most likely to deter future misconduct.
Clearly, deterrence is taken seriously in the context of scientific
research, as the reliance on the existence of peer review to
prevent misconduct by researchers attests.
A word about morale, however, is appropriate. Morale
suffers when people are forced to work in an atmosphere of
suspicion and second-guessing. Morale may already be a
problem among scientists because of the paucity of research
funds available to fund research ideas, particularly the ideas of
young scientists.'29 If a sort of institutionalized mistrust of
scientists is added to this problem, will the result be a restric-
tion of the availability or intellectual freedom of persons who
wish to engage in scientific research?
The question is certainly worth considering. It is particularly
relevant to the question whether a criminal investigation of a
given act of scientific misconduct should be initiated. In the
long run, however, the possibility of criminal prosecution of a
person for misconduct in a particular field or line of research
should not deter honest and talented persons from pursuing
128. Robert M. Anderson, The Federal Government's Role in Regulating
Misconduct in Scientific and Technological Research, 3 J.L. & TECH. 121, 126 (1988).
129. See, e.g., NIH Research Funding: Hearing Before the Intergovernmental
Relations and Human Resources Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1985) (remarks of Dr. Charles A. McCallum, Sr.
Vice-President for Health Affairs, University of Alabama at Birmingham).
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that field or line. Indeed, failure to police a profession vigor-
ously can lead to the general decline in reputation and public
acceptance of that profession, which can also result, in the case
of a governmentally funded profession, in a decline in monetary
support. Such results could ultimately have an even more
devastating impact on the scientific community's morale.
Morale may actually be enhanced by demonstrating that only
honest effort is rewarded and that those who obtain benefits
through misconduct are severely punished for their acts.
On balance, the interests of deterrence and condemnation
justify prosecution and outweigh the possible detriments of
treating scientific misconduct as a criminal law problem.
Potential impediments to and disadvantages of prosecuting are
not unique to this sort of misconduct, and may be taken into
account on a case-by-case basis, as they are for a number of
other federal crimes.
IV. STATUTES AVAILABLE FOR PROSECUTION OF
SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT
This section will examine the existing federal statutes that
have been used to prosecute scientific misconduct.
A. State v. Federal Interest
Prosecution of scientific misconduct should occur under
federal, not state statutes. The extent of federal funding of
scientific research creates a federal interest in protecting the
federal fisc. 13 ° Separate federal interests, such as protection
130. Basic research is associated primarily with university laboratories and
research institutes, which may be federally funded in whole or in part, or supported
by private funding. Although private funding is a source of money for basic research,
most financial support for such research comes from the federal government.
Dr. Minsky's testimony before a subcommittee of the House Committee on
Government Operations addressed this issue:
MR. LIGHTFOOT. Do we have research going on that wouldn't be occurring if we
didn't have the private money in terms of carrying something further? This
could be construed one of two different ways, I guess, and one of those ways
being that the combination of public/private funding is a larger pool of money
which takes research further down the road than what we could appropriate
from public funds. Maybe research has gone another step; otherwise it would
have stopped if we didn't have the private money to help fund it.
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of the integrity of governmental decisionmaking, may be
implicated as well when scientific misconduct is prosecuted
under the false statement or the mail fraud statutes. 131 The
federal government also has an interest in the uniform treat-
ment of persons working under federal grants, so that an
investigator in one state is subject to the same working rules
as an investigator in another state. Furthermore, given the
federal government's experience with funding and overseeing
scientific research, it has an expertise that individual states
might lack. Thus, while a state might decide to apply state
law sanctions, there is ample justification for a federal role in
policing scientific misconduct.'32
DR. [Leonard] MINSKY[, Ph.D., executive director, National Association of
Universities in the Public Interest] .... The corporate contribution to research
funds in universities is relatively small overall. When we started in 1983, the
corporate contribution was no more than 3 percent of the total of funds going
to research in universities .... My own best guess would be that at present
levels, it is 10 percent. That is, the corporate contribution to university-based
research is no more than 10 percent, while the Federal Government pays, and
therefore the public pays, for 90 percent of the research done in universities.
The total corporate investment is really small by comparison to the public
investment.
... However, corporate money is not the kind of money that finds its way
to the truly experimental or frontier research situations.
Conflicts Hearings, supra note 52, at 53.
See CONFLICTS REPORT, supra note 32, at 3. "The NIH is the largest funder of
biomedical research in the world. In Fiscal Year 1986, the NIH awarded 23,445
grants totalling over $3.7 billion to 1,303 institutions.... In Fiscal Year 1987, over
$4.4 billion in research grants was awarded." OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
OFFICE OF ANALYSIS AND INSPECTIONS, DEP'T OF HHS MISCONDUCT IN SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH, DRAFT REPORT 2 (September 1988), reprinted in Conflicts Hearings, supra
note 52, at 132.
Sources of federal funding of scientific research include the grants awarded by the
NIH and the NIMH, which are both part of the HHS. The Defense Department's
policy on the administration and support of basic research is found at 32 C.F.R. § 272
(1991).
131. See infra notes 133-50 and accompanying text.
132. There would seem to be no impediment, however, to prosecution on a local
level if the particular misconduct violated a state criminal statute. For example, the
misappropriation of another scientist's research proposal might constitute a property
crime. To the extent the misappropriation involves information or an idea rather
than an object, an interesting issue regarding the coverage of theft or misappropria-
tion statutes might arise. See, e.g., United States v. Lambert, 446 F. Supp. 890, 895
(D. Conn. 1978) (holding that it is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 to sell information
derived from government computer records), affd sub nom. United States v. Girard,
601 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979).
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B. False Statements and Fraud
There is no federal statute that specifically and discretely
punishes misrepresentation of research results as "fraud in
science" or "scientific misconduct." Instead, potentially
applicable federal statutes focus on two areas: submitting
false statements to the federal government and defrauding
someone through the use of a federally controllable means
(e.g., the mails or interstate wire communication facili-
ties).'33 Thus, if a scientific researcher falsely reported her
findings to the federal government in an application for
renewal of a research grant, that researcher might face
criminal liability under the generally applicable false state-
ment statute134 or the federal mail or wire fraud statutes.
135
133. To the extent that a particular researcher acted in concert with another
person in submitting false statements to the government or in obtaining grant funds
by fraud, liability might also lie under the federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371
(1988), either for conspiring to commit an offense against the United States or for
conspiring to defraud the United States.
134. The statute provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency
of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by
any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing
or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988). The maximum fine has been increased to the greater of
$250,000 (for individuals) or twice the amount of pecuniary gain to the defendant or
pecuniary loss to the victim. 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1988).
135. The federal mail fraud statute provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises .... for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent
or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such
matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the
direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the
person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988). The maximum fine has been increased by 18 U.S.C. § 3571
(1988).
The wire fraud statute tracks the mail fraud statute, but substitutes for the
mailing requirement the following: "transmits or causes to be transmitted by means
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The prosecution of Stephen Breuning is a good example of
how a criminal prosecution of scientific misconduct might be
structured under the false statement statute.3 6 According
to the indictment against him, Breuning conducted research
at the Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic, affiliated with
the University of Pittsburgh's Medical School. From July 1,
1982 to April 1984, under grants from the National Institute
of Mental Health (NIMH), Breuning was to study the effect of
stimulants on the behavior of hyperactive retarded children.
To obtain funding for the continuing phases of his proposed
study, Breuning was required to submit to NIMH applications
for continuation grants,'37 in which he described the prog-
ress he had made in the initial phase of the study.
Counts One and Two of the indictment against Breuning
alleged that several of the statements in each of the two
applications for continuing funding misrepresented the
numbers of persons included in the study and the results
obtained. 13' According to the government's sentencing
memorandum, "[W]hat appears to have happened, is that...
Stephen Breuning did not obtain the expected results. Rather
than lose the grant money which was going to the Western
Psychiatric Institute and Clinic he submitted false data to
support the continuation of this study."139 The sentencing
of wire, radio, or television communications in interstate or foreign commerce, any
writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme
or artifice." 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988).
136. Breuning was also charged with allegedly providing false information to the
NIH team investigating the allegations of misconduct against him under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1505 (1988), which provides punishment for endeavors to obstruct an agency
proceeding. Indictment at 12-18, United States v. Breuning, No. K-88-0135 (D. Md.
Apr. 15, 1988).
137. The first application was for continued funding from July 1, 1983 through
June 30, 1984, the second year of a two-year study that had initially been proposed
by Breuning and approved by NIMH. Indictment at 4, United States v. Breuning,
No. K-88-0135 (D. Md. Apr. 15, 1988). The second application, termed a competing
continuing application, was for approval of additional funding for a new study period
from July 1, 1984 through June 30, 1988 to follow up on the original two-year study.
Id. at 7-8.
138. Id. at 1-11. The story of the problems with Breuning's research is described
in Scientific Fraud, supra note 111, at 2, 4-65 (1988) (statement of Robert L.
Sprague, Ph.D., Professor, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign).
139. Gov't. Memorandum on Sentencing at 4, United States v. Breuning, No.
K-88-0135 (D. Md. Nov. 8, 1988).
According to a House Report, "Breuning's influence on the treatment of mentally
retarded children was extensive; for example, several States changed their treatment
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memorandum also refers to the government's investigation of
allegations of other misrepresentations by Breuning about
research he claimed to have completed. 4 ° This investigation
disclosed that "there [was] no evidence of data supporting
most of the research published by Dr. Breuning. In fact, the
research that was being done at the University of Pittsburgh
was producing contradictory information to that which Dr.
Breuning was officially reporting." 4 '
Breuning received a sentence of two years' incarceration for
each count, all but sixty days of which was suspended in favor
of probation. Breuning also was ordered to pay restitution,
perform community service, and refrain from employment as
a research psychologist for the five-year probation period.'42
The federal government also used the false statement
statute to prosecute employees of Industrial Bio-Test.
4 3
Specifically, IBT reported, or caused to be reported, to the
FDA false research data relevant to the assessment of the
safety of various commercial products.'44 The falsified data
included representations about the mortality rate and pathol-
ogy of rats used in tests.'45 The IBT case also involved
charges under the federal mail and wire fraud statutes.
46
Given a jurisdictional predicate,'47 the mail or wire fraud
statutes might offer some latitude and flexibility in shaping a
charge because of the differences in the elements of the mail
fraud and false statement offenses. The mail fraud statute
policies to conform to Breuning's reported research results." CONFLICTS REPORT,
supra note 32, at 13 (footnote omitted).
140. Gov't Memorandum on Sentencing at 9, Breuning (No. K-88-0135).
141. Id. at 9.
142. Judgment, United States v. Breuning No. K-88-0135 (D. Md. Nov. 10, 1988).
Breuning was ordered to serve the sixty-day sentence on work release at a community
treatment center or halfway house. The judge ordered that Breuning pay $11,352 in
restitution, and perform 250 hours of community service. In his plea agreement,
Breuning agreed not to be employed as a research psychologist for a period of ten
years following sentencing, and the court's sentence indicates that Breuning would be
subject to conviction for contempt if he violates that agreement. Id.
143. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
147. That is, a provable use of the mails or an interstate wire communication in
furtherance of the scheme or artifice to defraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) (mail fraud
statute); 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1988) (wire fraud statute).
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contemplates victims other than the government 14' and
encompasses more than the making of false statements. 49
Indeed, in the IBT prosecution, the defendants were convicted
under the mail fraud statute for omissions that could not form
the basis for liability under the false statement statute.
1 50
C. Impediments to Prosecution
In thinking about whether to apply the false statement and
mail and wire fraud statutes to acts of scientific misconduct,
a number of issues must be considered. Perhaps most
significant is the question of competence. 5' Investigators
and prosecutors will struggle with the problems of understand-
ing what happened and making the difficult judgment about
148. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
149. Id.
150. The trial court had refused to permit jury consideration of a particular
omission in its deliberations on a false statement count because there was no legal
duty to disclose the omitted information. United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678,
697 n.8 (7th Cir. 1985). The court of appeals upheld the mail fraud conviction
premised upon this omission, however, because:
[O]missions or concealment of material information can constitute fraud ...
cognizable under the mail fraud statute, without proof of a duty to disclose the
information pursuant to a specific statute or regulation .... Obviously, we do
not imply that all or even most instances of non-disclosure of information that
someone might find relevant come within the purview of the mail fraud
statute; nevertheless, under some circumstances concealment of material
information is fraudulent. The scheme to defraud "is not to be measured by
technicalities. Rather, the measure of fraud is its departure from moral
uprightness, fundamental honesty, fair play and candid dealings in the general
life of members in society."
Id. at 697-98 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Lindsey, 736 F.2d 433, 436
(7th Cir. 1984)). Therefore, fraud can be effected not only by deceitful statements but
also by statements of half-truths or by concealment of material facts. For example,
a mail fraud charge would allege that the defendant devised a scheme or device to
defraud the United States of grant money, and the reporting of falsified research
results (if mailed to the government) constituted part of that scheme, or, alterna-
tively, that the defendant sought to obtain money or property of the United States
(the grant) by false pretenses (the false reporting of research results). Since the false
statement statute would also reach this conduct, broader coverage yields no apparent
advantage in this context. When research is funded by entities other than the
government, however, it might be possible for the mail fraud statute to reach a case
in which a researcher falsified research on the theory that she defrauded the entity
that provided the funding. Of course, the government would have to prove that there
had been a mailing in furtherance of the scheme.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
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what should have happened, issues that to a large extent may
turn on scientific judgments about what a particular
researcher should or should not have done or known. No
doubt there would be instances in which the primary disputed
factual issue would not be what was done, but rather why it
was done, which in turn may be relevant to the question
whether the researcher acted with the requisite criminal
intent. 5 2 Therefore, the limitations on lay persons' (includ-
ing investigators, prosecutors, judges, and juries) ability to
understand and evaluate facts of a scientific nature are
relevant. A scientist whose work is being questioned would be
concerned that an investigator, prosecutor, judge, or jury, due
to an inability to understand adequately the underlying
scientific concepts, would conclude incorrectly that the
scientist misrepresented research results and did so with the
requisite mens rea.
Currently the legal system calls upon lawyers and juries to
make a number of determinations that might be characterized
as based primarily on scientific or technical evidence. For
example, patent cases can involve very detailed scientific or
technical issues, yet still may be tried before a jury. This
hurdle, then, is not unique to a prosecution for scientific
misconduct, though it may be more acute in this context. It
might be contended, for example, that some of the basic
research conducted in laboratories across the United States in
fields such as molecular biology, genetics, and physics is more
complex than the scientific or technical evidence involved in a
patent case.
The legal requirements for prosecution under the false
statement statute and the practical problems of convincing a
jury to convict, however, will help minimize this problem. As
a practical matter, criminal investigators and prosecutors will
tend to gravitate toward cases that do not involve a detailed
understanding or a resolution of difficult scientific issues. An
investigator must understand a matter well enough to
conclude and convince a prosecutor that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of a crime exists, and the prosecutor in turn
must be able to convince a jury and a judge. The false
152. See, e.g., the discussion of Gregor Mendel's work, supra note 7, and that of
Cyril Burt, supra text accompanying notes 24-28, raising the possibility of
inadvertent misrecording of data. The case of William Summerlin, supra notes 13-21
and accompanying text, raises the possibility of misunderstanding research methods
and results.
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statement statute requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that the statement in question is false and therefore, prosecu-
tors will only be attracted to cases in which the falsity is clear
and understandable.
153
Thus, there will be an inherent inclination to focus on
relatively less complex questions of historical fact, such as
whether certain experiments or tests were ever performed,
rather than on questions more likely to involve an interpreta-
tion of scientific data and an understanding of the underlying
153. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988). Perhaps a good example of the dangers of delving
into an ambiguous fact pattern is the congressional investigation of Nobel Laureate
David Baltimore. The House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, chaired by Congressman Dingell,
conducted hearings in the spring of 1989 focusing on the accuracy of a 1986 article
in Cell of which Baltimore was the lead author. Scientific Fraud: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The paper discussed research performed
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on the genetic basis for the immune
system. The allegations under investigation included claims that the paper reported
about an experiment that was never performed and that work papers relating to the
research had been back-dated. Larry Thompson, Science Under Fire: Behind the
Clash Between Congress and Nobel Laureate David Baltimore, WASH. POST, May 9,
1989, at Z12, Z14 (Health Section) [hereinafter Science Under Fire]. One media
account, describing the sharp exchanges between Baltimore and Dingell, highlighted
the difficulties presented when a nonscientist challenges a noted researcher:
In the end, the hearing became a contest between two giants: Dingell from
the Congress, Baltimore from the ivory towers of big-league science. Both men
are smart; both are powerful. Neither wanted to lose.
But the day did not seem to go well for Dingell, who read from an
unfamiliar script, filled with technical terms about the complexities of
transgenic Mu products and bet 1 antibodies.
Dingell went on to say that the questions about integrity were still
unanswered and that the inquiry would continue....
As Dingell moved to gavel shut the session, Baltimore, shaking with
adrenaline, asked: "Don't I get a chance to respond?"
Yes, Dingell responded.
The subcommittee had publicly accused him of scientific fraud, Baltimore
said, yet failed to produce any evidence.
Id. at Z12.
The hearings commanded considerable media attention. See, e.g., The Bruises of
a Battle over Science, BOSTON GLOBE, May 30, 1989, at 3; Warren E. Leary, Anxiety
Over the Science Police, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1989, at E6 [hereinafter Science Police];
Warren E. Leary, Scientists Defend Charges in Disputed Study, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
1989, at A13; No Letup in Debate over Research Paper, BOSTON GLOBE, May 10, 1989,
at 8.
It was later reported that Dr. Baltimore requested that the paper be retracted.
Malcolm Gladwell, Scientist Retracts Paper Amid Allegations of Fraud, WASH. POST,
Mar. 21, 1991, at Al.
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science, such as a claim that certain phenomena were observed
when a particular experiment was conducted. The focus of the
Breuning prosecution, for example, was the number of subjects
evaluated in his research,'54 an essentially historical fact
that does not turn upon the resolution of a disputed scientific
issue. The IBT prosecution also focused on historical facts like
the number of rat deaths, which could be ascertained without
debating a scientific theory.'
Complexity may be problematic nonetheless in the determi-
nation of materiality' 6 or mens rea under the false state-
ment statute. 57  Inadequate understanding of underlying
scientific principles might lead to an erroneous focus upon
inconsequential or inadvertent misstatements.
Although the materiality standard is not stringent, 5 8 the
high mens rea requirement and perceptions of jury appeal will
cause prosecutors to avoid fact patterns involving credible
claims of mistake or disagreement about debatable scientific
propositions. Once again, the more straightforward the false
statement, the easier it will be for a judge or jury to appreci-
ate what difference the false statement makes and why the
scientist would have made it.'59 A convincing showing is
necessary particularly because the defendant scientist is a
154. Indictment at 5-6, United States v. Breuning, No. K-88-0135 (Apr. 15,
1988).
155. See supra notes 71-73. Nevertheless, some matters of a scientific nature
did have to be considered in ascertaining the materiality of the false statements IBT
made. See supra note 71.
156. Although only the first clause of the false statement statute mentions
materiality, some courts have interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) to require proof of
materiality regardless of the prong under which the prosecution is brought. See
United States v. Whitaker, 848 F.2d 914, 916 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907 (1980);
Gonzales v. United States, 286 F.2d 118, 120 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
878 (1961); Freidus v. United States, 223 F.2d 598, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Contra
United States v. Rinaldi, 393 F.2d 97, 99-100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 913
(1968).
157. The mens rea requirement for a violation of the false statement statute is
"knowingly and willfully." See supra note 134.
158. See, e.g., United States v. Whitaker, 848 F.2d 914, 916 (8th Cir. 1988)
("'[M]ateriality involves only the capability of influencing an agency's governmental
functions'") (quoting United States v. Popov, 821 F.2d 483,488 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing
United States v. Richmond, 700 F.2d 1183, 1188 (8th Cir. 1983))); Weinstock v.
United States, 231 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (explaining that a statement is
material if it has a "natural tendency to influence" an agency's decision).
159. Materiality under the false statement statute has been held to be a question
of law, not of fact. United States v. Fern, 696 F.2d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Schaffer, 600 F.2d 1120, 1123 (5th Cir. 1979).
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person whom a jury may be reluctant to see as a criminal. In
any case, complexity is likely to generate momentum not to
prosecute, particularly in weaker cases.
Serious consideration must be paid to whether prosecution
presents a danger of chilling scientific endeavor by injecting
the possibility that criminal investigators and prosecutors will
second-guess a researcher's conclusions and reports. History
demonstrates the dangers of excessive government involve-
ment in the scientific process,16 ° and those dangers should
not be overlooked because of the need to address scientific
misconduct.161 The prospect for government manipulation
of science already exists, however, because of the extent of
government funding of scientific research.'62  American
160. A notorious example is comes from the history of the Soviet Union and
involves the agricultural theories of Trofim Lysenko:
Trofim D. Lysenko, a Soviet agronomist active during the period between
1929 and 1965, won the highest Communist Party support for an effort which,
in essence, was based on the annihilation of the science of genetics. The
Marxist ideology was founded on the concept of the malleability of human
nature. In support of this theory Lysenko applied his energy and drive to
show that the nature of plants can also be moulded by the environmental
conditions, notwithstanding their genetic character.
Lysenko rebelled totally against modern-day science. His multi-faceted
activities involving the top levels of Soviet agriculture stemmed from his
arrogant belief that he knew better than the academic scientists how to
increase the yields of agricultural products. This led to a situation where
Soviet agriculture was abused for 35 years.
KOHN, supra note 3, at 63. Broad and Wade note the following lesson from the
Lysenko affair:
The Lysenko affair is usually recounted, in simplified form, for the purpose
of warning politicians never to jeopardize the autonomy of science. The moral
is correctly drawn, but the full version of the complex history contains another,
less obvious lesson: that scientists and their institutions do not always
possess the inner strength to protect their deepest principles from political
encroachment.
BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 186.
161. See, for example, the concern that was voiced over even congressional
inquiry about scientific practices when Congressman Dingell led an inquiry into
research supervised by David Baltimore, discussed supra note 153. Media reports
described the adverse reaction of some in the scientific community to the congres-
sional inquiry. "Visions of 'science police' making unannounced laboratory visits,
pawing through notebooks, auditing data and demanding explanations for every error
are sending chills through the corridors of universities and research institutions
nationwide." Science Police, supra note 153, at E6.
162. As Harold P. Green noted:
My problem is that the fact of the matter is that science and scientists today
are not autonomous. They are attached to an umbilical cord running from
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history is not replete with instances of criminal prosecution
for misconduct in the guise of promoting or suppressing
certain academic endeavors.6 3
Legitimate scientific effort may also be chilled by prosecu-
tion of scientists who deceive themselves about the results of
their own work. Self-deception'64 may result in the making
and reporting of observations of phenomena that simply did
not occur. If a scientist's misunderstanding of or wishful
thinking about experimental results could be interpreted as
falsification of those results, concern may be raised about the
possibility of prosecuting bad science rather than deliberate
misrepresentation.
The mens rea requirement for the false statement statute
should preclude imposing liability for misrepresentations that
are not knowingly false.'65 The free flow of ideas in the
scientific community, arguably, still could be chilled because
even under a high, subjective standard of mens rea, a jury
inevitably will take into account whether it was possible for
a reported phenomenon to have occurred and whether a
their laboratories to the United States Treasury. Once they see that the public
pays, they have lost their autonomy, they become subject to an absolute extent
to the play of the political process .... There simply is no way to escape that
problem. Science has lost its virginity. I suspect from this point on and
forevermore it is inextricably enmeshed in the rough-and-tumble of the
political process, and there is no escape.
Biomedical Research, supra note 81, at 54 (remarks of Harold P. Green, J.D.,
Professor of Law, The National Law Center, George Washington University).
163. A notable exception might be the Scopes trial. John T. Scopes, a science
teacher in Dayton, Tennessee, was convicted in 1925 for violating a statute which
prohibited teaching the theory of evolution. Scopes, however, had previously agreed
to serve as protagonist in a test case sponsored by the American Civil Liberties
Union. His "arrest" consisted only of the president of the school board calling a
reporter to report the bringing of charges. Scopes was fined $100, but received no
other punishment. Jerry R. Tompkins, John Thomas Scopes: A Profile, in D-DAYS
AT DAYTON: REFLECTIONS ON THE SCOPES TRIAL 11-14 (Jerry R. Tompkins ed., 1965).
164. For a discussion of self-deception, see BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at
107-25; KOHN, supra note 3, at 18-34; ROBERT ROSENTHAL, EXPERIMENTER EFFECTS
IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 3-26 (1976). A good example is the claimed discovery of
N-Rays by French physicist Rene Blondlot. These rays were supposed to be
manifested by an increase in brightness of an object exposed to the rays, an increase
visually detected not only by Blondlot but by a good number of other scientists.
Indeed, "the pursuit of N-Rays had become a minor industry among French
scientists." BROAD & WADE, supra note 3, at 113. In fact, "N-Rays do not exist. The
researchers who reported seeing them were the victims of self-deception." Id. at 113;
see also KOHN, supra note 3, at 18-20.
165. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) requires proof of knowledge of falsity or in some
cases willful blindness. See, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
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reasonable scientist under the circumstances would have
observed it, both of which may involve resolution of the
scientific merit of the scientist's claim.
As a practical matter, these fact patterns present less
attractive vehicles for prosecution because of their complexity
and ambiguity. As a result, the possibility for prosecution in
this context is more apparent than real. Moreover, one
questions whether there are many cases in which legitimate
scientific effort coexists with proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that a scientist knowingly made a false statement regarding
her research results. Finally, the possibility of erroneous
conviction never can be totally eliminated for any offense, and
does not present a convincing argument for foregoing criminal
sanctions altogether.
As with any complex matter, a particular difficulty is
gauging whether a particular investigation or prosecution is
worth the resources expended. Simply investigating, let alone
prosecuting, any claim of scientific misconduct would be time-
consuming and expensive. 166 As noted earlier, this problem
is particularly acute if the money used to investigate comes
indirectly from funds that otherwise would be spent on
research itself.'67 Given the broad range and large number
of serious criminal law problems facing already overworked
prosecutors, these crimes are arguably of low priority, particu-
larly if the offenses are unlikely to lead to jail time.
168
166. The IBT case, for example, discussed supra notes 61-79 and accompanying
text, produced "a trial that lasted more than six months[,] ... more than 17,000
pages of transcript,. . . [and appellate] briefs totaling more than 500 pages." United
States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678, 683 (7th Cir. 1985).
167. The potential for diverting research funds was demonstrated during the
congressional investigation of research supervised by David Baltimore, discussed
supra note 153. According to a media account, lawyers paid by the research institute
Baltimore heads accompanied Baltimore to the congressional hearing. Science Under
Fire, supra note 153, at Z13.
168. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines may to some extent obviate this problem
since they embody a philosophy of a little jail time for everyone. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, supra note 122 § 1A4(d). For most crimes, the Sentencing Guidelines
require at least a minimal period of alternative custody (such as intermittent or
community confinement) even for first offenders. Id. Absent a departure, the
Guidelines authorize straight probation only when the lower number of the sentenc-
ing range is zero. Id. § 5B1.1. For crimes like submitting a false statement to the
government, the lower end of the sentencing range is zero for a first offender only for
crimes involving amounts of less than $2,000. Id. ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Table).
This assumes the offense level does not increase because of offense characteristics
other than the amount involved, as with offenses involving "more than minimal
planning." Id. §§ 2F1.1(a), (b)(1)(A), (b)(2).
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These are difficult arguments to discuss in part because
they involve largely unproved and unprovable perceptions
about the societal significance of certain types of criminal
conduct. How would one rank the harm of the following
crimes-the misrepresentation of research results in order to
receive a grant, embezzlement of bank funds, cheating on
welfare payments, and tax fraud-to society's sense of secu-
rity? Unless one is prepared to impose a wide-ranging, a
priori limitation, such as no non-violent crime should be
prosecuted, the prosecutor's office should evaluate the investi-
gative or prosecutorial merit of scientific fraud cases according
to its standard policies. Prosecutorial guidelines may consider
various factors, including the perceived problems and the need
for deterrence, the prosecutorial and investigative resources
available, the existence of meaningful administrative or civil
sanctions, and the amount of money involved." 9 But the
decision should not be made in a vacuum, on the assumption
that no case of this genre is "worth it."
Moreover, given that initial investigative powers are
relegated to the institution with which the questioned
research is associated, 7 ° it is important that prosecutors and
investigative agencies provide guidance to the institution.'
17
Currently, colleagues and associates of a person suspected of
misconduct are responsible for the initial evaluation of the
allegation, conducting the investigation (or deciding not to),
and making recommendations for further action. Although
this procedure stems from the legitimate interests of having
the investigation conducted by people with sufficient expertise
to understand the matter under investigation, avoiding undue
disruption of research and negative impact on reputation, and
avoiding unnecessary expense and delay, it creates conflicting
interests for the investigative institution.
In the context of funded research, internal investigation
may be problematic when the institution is the beneficiary of
the research grant,'72 because the institution or persons
169. See A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.9(b); see also, Leonard
E. Beck, The Administrative Law of Criminal Prosecution: The Development of
Prosecutorial Policy, 27 AM. U. L. REv. 310, 313-21 (1978) (explaining the types of
prosecutorial policies and providing some examples).
170. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 689.3(a), 689.4(d)(1), (2) (1991).
171. Anderson, supra note 128, at 132-35.
172. Typically, the institution would be the named recipient of the grant, and the
researcher designated the lead investigator. Anderson, supra note 128, at 132.
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within it assigned to do the investigation may be faulted for
failure to exercise adequate supervision of the questioned
research if misconduct is found to have occurred. In-house
investigations generate other sorts of psychological pressure;
it may be difficult to criticize or jeopardize the career of a
colleague. Conversely, someone seeking to reduce competition
or "with an ax to grind" may be biased against the accused.
Further, investigators may be influenced by the reputation or
perceived power of the person accused.173
The institutional and personal conflicts that can occur in
investigating claims of wrongdoing make it especially impor-
tant that there be outside input into or review of the decision,
whether or not a particular incident is a criminal matter.
Congress has worked toward this goal by creating investi-
gative units within the Public Health Service (PHS) to deal
with matters relating to scientific fraud.'74 These offices,
173. Internal investigations have been characterized as slow, superficial, and
reluctant to criticize senior personnel accused of wrongdoing. See, e.g., CONFLICTS
REPORT, supra note 32, at 62-63. They also may fall victim to a desire to "sweep
under the rug" matters that need to be pursued further:
When the allegations against Dr. Breuning were brought to the attention
of the University of Pittsburgh Medical School by NIMH, the Medical School
conducted a superficial investigation that convinced them that Dr. Breuning
was guilty of scientific fraud. Rather than investigating Dr. Breuning's work
in greater depth, in order to determine exactly which research was fraudulent,
the Medical School urged Dr. Breuning to resign without any public criticism,
enabling him to obtain a position as Chief of Psychological Services at Polk
Center, a State institution for the mentally retarded. In that position,
Dr. Breuning was responsible for treatment decisions for retarded children,
who themselves were put at risk by his fraudulent research claims.
The Polk Center was not notified of any allegations against Breuning, and
the letters of recommendation from the University of Pittsburgh did not
mention them. Dr. Breuning continued to be considered an expert in the field,
discussing his research at conferences all over the country.
Id. at 13 (footnotes omitted).
174. The two units are the Office of Scientific Integrity (OSI), which is part of the
Office of the Director of NIH, and the Office of Scientific Integrity Review (OSIR),
part of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health. 42 C.F.R. § 50.102 (1990).
OSI "oversees the implementation of all PHS policies and procedures related to
scientific misconduct; monitors the individual investigations into alleged or suspected
scientific misconduct conducted by institutions that receive PHS funds for biomedical
or behavioral research projects or programs; and conducts investigations as
necessary." Id. OSIR
is responsible for establishing overall PHS policies and procedures for dealing
with misconduct in science, overseeing the activities of PHS research agencies
to ensure that these policies and procedures are implemented, and reviewing
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although not completely independent, are at least functionally
removed from the subject of the investigation. They can consult
with prosecutors both to develop standardized criteria for
declining to prosecute or declining to initiate a criminal
investigation, and to obtain a decision to decline prosecution in
individual cases.175 These criteria will reduce the influence
an individual's reputation has on the ultimate decisions to
investigate and prosecute. In addition, institutions will be
under less pressure because they will not be making the final
decision about a colleague's work. Standardized criteria will
also enhance both the public perception that alleged wrong-
doing is investigated without favor or animus and the percep-
tion that allegations about scientific misconduct are taken
seriously.17
all final reports of investigations to assure that any findings and recommen-
dations are sufficiently documented. The OSIR also makes final recommenda-
tions to the Assistant Secretary for Health on whether any sanctions should
be imposed and, if so, what they should be in any case where scientific
misconduct has been established.
Id.
175. As a document submitted to the House Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight of the Committee on Science and Technology noted:
During this same ll-year period [from 1970 to 1981], DMSR [Division of
Management Survey and Review, NIH], has worked on a total of 375 surveys,
reviews or projects, and investigated 33 "hotline" referrals from the Office of
the Inspector General. Few of these 408 cases involved scientific issues;
rather, they mostly involved financial or managerial matters. In each instance
where DMSR found even a hint of suspected criminal activity, the case was
referred to the appropriate investigatory organization [i.e., to the Office of
Inspector General which then refers it to the FBI or the United States
Attorney's office].
Fraud in Biomedical Research, supra note 21, at 48 (Response of the Director, NIH,
to questions from Congressman Albert Gore, Jr.).
176. It might also help combat a claim of selective prosecution, a defense that
was raised in the Breuning case. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment at 1,
United States v. Breuning, No. K-88-0135 (D. Md. May 9, 1988); Gov't's Consolidated
Response to Defendant's Motions at 3-11, United States v. Breuning, No. K-88-0135
(D. Md. June 16, 1988).
Some might be concerned about the possibility of a scientist trying to gain an
advantage by making false accusations against another scientist, thus tying up the
competitor's time and reputation with allegations and investigations of wrongdoing.
To some extent, however, this problem exists regardless of the type of criminal
conduct involved. Moreover, criminal investigators and prosecutors are unlikely to
initiate criminal investigations without a substantial showing of criminality. Finally,
falsely reporting a crime can itself be a crime. See United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S.
475, 481-84 (1984) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) (false statement statute) to
include a false report of a crime to the FBI).
WINTER 1992] 413
414 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 25:2
V. A STATUTORY PROPOSAL
A federal criminal statute directed explicitly at scientific
misconduct should be enacted in order to expressly indicate
public intolerance of Scientific misconduct.177  Although
statutes such as the false statement statute currently provide
general coverage for certain forms of misbehavior, a specific
statute for scientific misconduct offers several advantages.
178
As procedures for dealing with allegations of scientific misconduct have developed,
the scientific community has discussed safeguards for researchers who are accused
of wrongdoing. Among the issues of concern are: the due process rights of an
accused researcher if a state or federal institution is involved in taking adverse action
such as the termination of a grant or employment; the extent to which allegations can
or should be made known to the scientific community, a funding agency, prospective
employers, or the public; the potential liability of institutions and professional
journals for libel, defamation, wrongful discharge, or other injury to a researcher
accused of wrongdoing; and the protection of"whistleblowers." See, e.g., PROJECT ON
SCIENTIFIC FRAUD, supra note 3, at 3-23, 28-30.
177. In addition, some steps that could be taken to close loopholes under existing
statutes include imposing criminal liability for deliberate failure to maintain records
relating to the conduct of scientific research funded with federal monies. Currently
it is a crime to destroy government records. 18 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988). This approach
would assert a public interest in the records generated by government-funded
research, and recognize omissions liability both by creating a duty to act and by
punishing the deliberate failure to act. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(e), 333 (1988)
(making the failure to establish or maintain certain records relating to food or drugs
a misdemeanor). A chief benefit of such a statute would be to preclude a scientist
from arguing during an investigation of the soundness of his work that his data
cannot be substantiated because no data were kept. The deliberate failure to keep
records hardly can be said to contribute anything positive to science or to be part and
parcel of intellectual freedom. While one can argue that misbehavior simply could
shift from false claims of nonrecordation to the fabrication of records or to false
claims of loss of records, it is still worthwhile to close the "I didn't write it down"
loophole. One might infer that the more elaborate the falsification, the less likely
someone would be to undertake it. In any event, it is conceivable that active
falsification, will be easier to detect.
178. Congress has raised the possibility of criminalizing the intentional
misreporting of scientific studies to an unreceptive scientific audience:
Dr. [Jerome] JACOBSTEIN[, M. D., Director of Nuclear Medicine, Graduate
Hospital, University of Pennsylvania]. My own opinion is that's going too far.
I don't think we need to make this a criminal matter in order to bring it under
control. We have to devise some sort of oversight mechanism, and although,
of course, that would be one option, it seems to me there ought to be others
that do not bring it into that realm.
Dr. [Robert L.] SPRAGUE [, Ph.D., Professor, University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign]. I would agree, I think it is going too far. I would be very
concerned about the meaning of intentional here. This is such a complex area
that I can see a great deal of difficulty in trying to define that appropriately.
So I think that's going too far, at least at this point.
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First, it permits a specific delineation of the actus reus and
mens rea appropriate in this context. In a number of other
contexts, Congress has supplemented a general criminal
statute with more specific criminal statutes tailored to
particular facets of the conduct involved.179 Targeting par-
ticular problem areas helps to focus public and investigative
attention upon certain types of conduct. It further permits
some more meaningful description of specific categories of
proscribed behavior, taking into account any considerations
unique to that area.
Second, a specific statute proscribing scientific misconduct
permits consideration of permissible defenses such as a recan-
tation defense. Third, it offers the possibility of tailoring the
punishment for this type of conduct. Individual treatment
would permit consideration of an aggravated and unaggra-
vated form of the crime (spanning the felony/misdemeanor
distinction) and also would permit some much needed latitude
in prosecuting false statement offenses. A specific statute
could make clear a court's power to impose restitution of grant
funds.8 0 In addition, because of the complexity of these
sorts of cases and the perceived desirability in the scientific
community of having allegations initially reviewed by the
affected institutions, I would urge that the statute of limita-
tions for this offense be extended to at least six years.
Scientific Fraud, supra note 111, at 111-12. Mr. Walter Stewart, scientist, NIH,
later responded:
But we-just as the previous panel had some reservations about the
criminal side of the thing, we almost-I would almost go in the other direction.
I think one of the things that inhibits people from simply correcting
errors-I am now backing off the question of scientific fraud and addressing
the question of scientific error-is the possibility they may be judged to have
engaged in misconduct in some way .... And I think one of the problems with
addressing this via the criminal system is simply that it might increase the
level of fear.
Id. at 134.
179. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) (general false statement statute); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1005 (1988). (false bank entries); 18 U.S.C. § 1011 (1988) (false statements to federal
land bank); 18 U.S.C. § 1012 (1988) (false statements to Department of Housing and
Urban Development).
180. Although 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663, 3664 (1988) provide for restitution as a penalty
for title 18 offenses, in the context of a false statement offense the concepts of victim
and of loss attributable to the offense can be incongruous or perhaps inadequate to
express the requirement that the defendant pay restitution, at least in the amount
of any benefit she received as a result of the false statement.
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I propose a two-tier statute that embraces both a felony and
a misdemeanor provision. The base offense, to be treated as a
misdemeanor, would penalize one for knowingly making a
material false statement or representation l8 about research
results or about the method by which they were obtained. The
aggravated form of the crime would provide enhanced penalties
if particularly egregious behavior were proved, such as acting
with intent to defraud, engaging in multiple and discrete acts
of misrepresentation, or causing harm by inducing reliance on
the falsified research.
8 2
The federal jurisdictional basis could be a finding by Con-
gress that research embraces a class of activities that affect
commerce."i 3 Alternatively, Congress could consider a more
narrowly drawn statute that focuses only upon federally funded
research; the existence of some percentage or amount of federal
funding could be deemed a sufficient federal interest to justify
intervention.
8 4
A triggering mechanism under the broader approach would
need to be selected in order to fix the point at which criminal
consequences would flow-the locus penitentiae, one might say.
This point should be fixed late in the process of formulating and
reporting research results, so that a fair degree of formality
attends the making of the statement. This will give the
wrongdoer notice of the act's solemnity and the need for
truthful reporting.8 5 Publication to the government or to the
181. An example of a false representation might be knowingly mislabeling
photographs that accompanied a description of research results.
182. Cf. 21 U.S.C. §§ 333(a), (b) (1988) (elevating misdemeanor to felony upon
proof of "intent to defraud or mislead"). Although permitting misdemeanor treatment
may result in more lenient disposition for this sort of misconduct than is currently
permitted under the general false statement statute, it is justified by several
considerations. First, it may reduce reluctance to prosecute. Second, it distinguishes
more serious from less serious conduct. Third, it allows flexibility in plea bargaining
that is currently unavailable under the false statement statute.
183. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 153-54 (1971) (holding that
Congress can believe that even intra-state and extortionate credit transactions can
affect interstate commerce). But see Anderson, supra note 128, at 124 (indicating
that federal intervention is warranted only when federal funds are involved).
184. An example of such a statute is 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1988), which criminalizes
bribery and theft in certain federally funded projects.
185. A certification requirement, either in making statements to the government,
or in publishing research results, would help to fix the point in time at which a
scientist is vouching for the truthfulness of the information reported.
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scientific community, knowing that the reported results will be
considered truthful reflections of data and results actually
obtained by the scientist, would represent such an occasion.
186
For a narrowly drawn statute, embracing only federally
funded research, one model upon which to draw is the "in
connection with" language found in the securities context. 7
Thus, one formulation might proscribe "knowingly making a
material false statement in connection with federally funded
scientific research." This formulation conceivably could
embrace more than the submission of a statement directly to
the government, 8 but again it is desirable to trigger liability
only when a scientist makes formal representations about her
research.
The mens rea for the base offense should be "knowingly."
This requirement comports with the more recent federal perjury
statute' 89 and avoids the pitfalls of the term "willfully," now
found in the false statement statute. 90 In addition, it is a
186. The argument has been raised that premising prosecution on the publication
of information chills constitutionally protected speech. See In re Grand Jury Matter
(Gronowicz), 764 F.2d 983, 987-89 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986)
(rejecting the argument that the First Amendment protects authors from prosecution
on the contents of a publication); Note, Mail Fraud and Free Speech, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 942 (1986) (criticizing the Gronowicz decision and urging that use of the mail
fraud statute to punish criminal libel be limited to cases where the government can
establish a compelling interest). The high mens rea requirement of the proposed
approach, coupled with the strong governmental interest in regulating, should satisfy
the requirements of Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78 (1964) (holding that a
Louisiana defamation law was unconstitutional because it punished even true
statements made with actual malice and false statements about public officials
regardless of the speaker's reasonable beliefs at the time of the statement).
187. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988) (prohibiting the use of a manipulative or
deceptive device "in connection with the purchase or sale, of any security registered
on a national securities exchange") (emphasis added).
188. The general false statement statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988), has been held
to embrace false statements not made directly to the U.S. government, so long as "it
was contemplated that the statement was to be utilized in a matter which was within
the jurisdiction of [a] department or agency." United States v. Candella, 487 F.2d
1223, 1227 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974). Moreover, false
statements in documents subject to federal inspection have been held to fall within
18 U.S.C. § 1001. United States v. Diaz, 690 F.2d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 1982); Coil
v. United States, 343 F.2d 573, 575-76 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 821 (1965).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1988).
190. Judge Learned Hand's comments about the word "wilful," made during
formulation of the Model Penal Code, bear repeating on this point: "It's an awful
word! It is one of the most troublesome words in a statute that I know. If I were to
have the index purged, 'wilful' would lead all the rest in spite of its being at the end
of the alphabet." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 commentary on § 2.02(8), at 249 n.47.
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sufficiently high mens rea requirement to avoid any concern
about prosecuting scientists for mistake or for negligence.' 9 '
To avoid the inevitable confusion about the extent to which
"knowingly" modifies other components of the proposed
statute, I would make clear that "knowingly" applies to both
the act of making the statement or representation and the fact
that the statement or misrepresentation is false. If Congress
selects a narrower jurisdictional base of federally funded
research, the mens rea for the federal connection should be no
higher than "knows or should know."' 92
The proposed standard is simple to articulate and apply,
incorporates behavior that is unquestionably wrong and that
has significant potential for harm (economic or otherwise), and
does not inject an appreciable possibility of second-guessing
legitimate scientific debate in interpreting data. Nonetheless,
a recantation defense, comparable to that recognized under the
newer federal perjury statute,'93 could be included to encour-
age scientists to correct the record if error is detected, rather
than remaining silent when new data contradicting old data or
conclusions are generated. Such a provision would help ensure
a perception that inadvertent or good faith mistakes in report-
ing or interpreting research data would not be punished.
Discrete treatment in federal criminal law for scientific
misconduct would dovetail with the current impetus toward
enhanced efforts at self-policing. 194 The scientific community
has developed a number of procedures, including investigative
procedures for dealing with allegations of scientific misconduct,
to address practices that have been criticized as improper or
191. The term "knowingly" in federal criminal statutes has been interpreted to
include deliberate ignorance. E.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th
Cir. 1976). This interpretation, however, still embraces a highly culpable state of
mind.
192. Cf. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 631 (1984) (discussing mens rea
requirements for the jurisdictional element of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988)).
193. The statute provides:
Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury proceeding in which a
declaration is made, the person making the declaration admits such declara-
tion to be false, such admission shall bar prosecution under this section if, at
the time the admission is made, the declaration has not substantially affected
the proceeding, or it has not become manifest that such falsity has been or will
be exposed.
18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (1988).
194. See generally Anderson, supra note 128, at 135-38; Harold P. Green,
Scientific Responsibility and the Law, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1009, 1016-22 (1987).
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conducive to improper conduct both by private institutions'95
and by the federal government. Watchdog units have been
created within the PHS. 96 In addition, under the PHS's
guidelines, institutions receiving grants for biomedical and
behavioral research are required to submit annual assurances
that they have an administrative procedure to review reports of
scientific misconduct and will report to the Office of Scientific
Integrity whether any investigation is warranted as a result of
that initial review.
197
A number of steps have been taken to tighten up laboratory
practices, such as the federal government's adoption of rules
regarding laboratory practices. 9 8 In addition, private institu-
tions have adopted rules regarding possible conflicts of inter-
est,' 99 and some scientific journals have adopted policies
requiring disclosure of an author's financial interests in the
research about which he is publishing. °° Other journals'
publication policies have been changed to deal with perceived
abuses. For example, several journals have instituted
certification requirements to enhance the personal responsibil-
ity of listed coauthors for the content of an article. This
practice includes requiring authors to sign a form attesting to
the authenticity of the data and committing them to produce
data upon request or requiring authors to certify that they
made a significant contribution to the work and have taken
care to ensure its scientific integrity. 0
These reforms are certainly noteworthy efforts to address
problems within the scientific community on a broad level;
195. Grantees have been criticized as slow to develop and abide by these
procedures. See, e.g., Conflicts Hearings, supra note 52, at 105-61. A description of
the procedures adopted by some universities is found in PROJECT ON SCIENTIFIC
FRAUD, supra note 3, at 12-17.
196. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
197. 42 C.F.R. § 50.103 (1990).
198. See supra note 55.
199. See, e.g., Bernadine Healy et al., Special Report, Conflict-of-Interest
Guidelines for a Multicenter Clinical Trial of Treatment After Coronary-Artery
Bypass-Graft Surgery, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 949, 951 (1989). Efforts to deal with
conflicts of interest at the federal and private levels are discussed and in part
criticized in CONFLICTS REPORT, supra note 32, at 52-59, 64-68; see also Booth, supra
note 53, at 1496 (discussing how Harvard's Dr. Scheffer C.G. Tseng tested an eye
ointment in which he had a significant financial interest).
200. See CONFLICTS REPORT, supra note 32, at 57-59 (discussing the New
England Journal of Medicine and the Journal of the American Medical Association).
201. See CONFLICTS REPORT, supra note 32, at 57-58.
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implementing institutional reform is a significant step toward
control of the problem of scientific misconduct. Yet the deter-
rent force of the criminal law should not be overlooked.
Indeed, additional scrutiny may lead to the discovery of
information about the nature and frequency of scientific
misconduct, and the extent to which new statutes are needed
to address conduct deserving of prosecution. °2 Thus, to
assure the most rational consideration of further development
of criminal sanctions, the problems of misconduct in science
and the impact of oversight of scientific research should be
studied in light of recently developed internal controls.
Whether it be through the enactment of new statutes or
through current criminal statutes, an effective deterrent can
be generated by creating a credible threat of prosecution.
Enhanced law enforcement efforts to consider and initiate
prosecution in appropriate cases will go far toward the
achievement of that goal.
CONCLUSION
Meaningful oversight of scientific research is a valuable tool
for deterring misconduct that endangers the integrity of the
process of scientific research, even if some risk of chilling
202. There are at least two obstacles one must confront in considering more
open-ended federal criminal coverage for scientific misconduct. First, there is the
problem of drafting a statute that is even reasonably specific about what is
prohibited. Scientists need to know, clearly and in advance, what types of conduct
on their part would likely lead to criminal investigation-of course, the Constitution
compels fair notice as well if the prosecution stage is reached. Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ("a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law"). Terms like "misconduct," even if qualified by stringent mens rea
requirements, may be too amorphous to both provide meaningful guidance and avoid
intrusion upon legitimate scientific debate.
Second, there is the concern of injecting issues of the scientific merit of a
researcher's work, issues that are not particularly conducive to resolution in a
criminal law forum and that may pose the risk of chilling legitimate scientific
endeavor. Certainly, an effective prosecutive effort requires statutes with enough
flexibility to address the myriad of factual situations that cannot be anticipated at
the outset, but the more broad the definition of the offense, the more likely it is that
questions of scientific merit will become relevant.
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scientific thought results. The lack of oversight appears to
create an elite class of persons who are exempt from punish-
ment for cheating. On balance, the lesser of the two evils is
supervision, trusting common sense to observe reasonable
limitations. In the long run, the more corrosive force is the
undermining of public confidence in an important public
institution and the engendering of a cynical perception that
the reporting and the funding of scientific research is a rigged
game. Criminal prosecution plays a valuable role in demon-
strating a commitment to absolute integrity in this important
arena.
When considering criminal prosecution, the prospect of
discouraging legitimate effort cannot be overlooked. Complete
protection from scientific misconduct, indeed if achievable at
all, is achievable at a cost we should not want to pay. Our
objective must be to have a serious commitment to prosecuting
cheaters when found and to have sufficiently satisfactory tools
to do so. Careful consideration should be given to the enact-
ment of a new federal criminal statute tailored specifically to
meet the goals of deterrence and condemnation. Vigilant but
judicious use of such a statute or of the currently available
federal statutes will achieve these goals without impairing the
legitimate processes of scientific endeavor.
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